(14)

A CORRECT COPY OF SOME NOTES *Concerning* Gods Decrees, Especially Of *REPROBATION.*

Written for the *private Use* of a *Friend* in *Northampton-Shire.* And now *published* to *prevent Calumny.*

Ἐυλαβοῦ τὰς διαβολὰς κἂν ψευδεῖς ὦσι. *Isocrat.*

(T: P)[ierce]

LONDON,
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To a *Perſon* of *Honour* and *Integrity*, who was the *principal perſwader* to this *Publication*.

THough I could not well anſwer your former Reaſons *why I ſhould publiſh a* true Copy *to* anticipate *a* falſe *one, yet I was willing to be* obſtinate *in a caſe of* this nature; *wherein to* vindicate *my* credit, *did ſeem (to me) too great a* prejudice *to my* eaſe; *and was thought (by ſome friends) to be a* hazarding *of my* ſafety. *And as I have never been delighted to lye* busking *in the* Sun, *ſo of late (more eſpecially) I have been even ſo* Amorous *of living* retiredly *in the* ſhade, *that I would fain have provided for my* Peace *and* Quiet, *as more conſiderable to* me *then my* Reputation. *Not that I dare be ſo* wedded *to* eaſe, *or* ſafety, *as* guiltily *to* court *them by* ſloth, *or* cowardize; *nor that I dare be ſo* indifferent *to the* good opinion *of* good men, *as not to* deſire *to be very* well thought on; *but becauſe I had reſolv'd to* ſit *and* ſmile *upon my* ſufferings, *and to purchaſe the* continuance *of my* beloved obſcurity *and* repoſe, *by that which I thought a* lawful means; *even the* burying *my ſelf amongſt my* books, *and living under the* protection *of* paſſive ſilence. *But having put my* Judgement *into other mens* hands, *and more eſpecially into* yours, *and being perfectly* conquer'd *by your* this weeks *letter, who was but* diſorder'd *by your* laſt, *(againſt which I muſt confeſſe I did rather* ſtand out, *by an affected* deafneſſe, *then any real diſſent) and being now no longer threatned by* bare report, *but by* one *who profeſſeth (under* hand *and* Seal) *to have*

been writing againſt papers *which he cals* mine, (*adding, that he intends to make them* publick) *I finde my ſelf brought to ſuch an unfortunate* Dilemma, (*either of having a* falſe copy *printed, or elſe of printing a* true copy *to diſcountenance the* falſe,) *that I* muſt *pitch upon this* latter *as the* leſſer evil. *And ſo your* wiſhes *and my* fears *are come upon me; whileſt I lie under a* neceſſity *of* going abroad *into the* world, *meerly in order to my very* privacy *and* peace. *For the very ſame* Letter *which threatens the* publiſhing *of* papers falſly *bearing my* Name, *cals me the* Grandchilde *of* Pelagius, the Enemy of God, of Chriſt, *and* of his Church, *with more ſuch* ἀιχχολογία, *then I will ever repay in kinde. The greateſt revenge that I will ſeek, ſhall be* (*in* love *to his* perſon) *to* conceal *his* Name. *I hope my* Soul *hath been* dieted with cleaner food, *then to* break out *at the* mouth *into ſuch* exulcerate Eryſipelas. *And that I ſhall* get moderation *by thoſe very* means, *by which I finde ſome men have* loſt *it. And though I hope it doth not lie in the power of any man to* infect *my* Name *with ſuch a* Leproſie, *as to make it* loathſome *to* ſuch *perſons by whom I deſire to be* approved, *yet have I* hated *the* publication *of this my* ſcribling, *for fear ſome* young *or* old Trojan *ſhould make it an* Apple *of* Altercation. *For you know this* Age *is full of* Salamanders, *who never live ſo pleaſantly as in the* Fire *of* Contention: *in hopes to* expire *and to be buried* (*like ſome* Pauſanias *or* Heroſtratus) *in the* Armes *of* Fame, *though not of* Glory. *And truly this is the reaſon, why I have* ſuffer'd *ſo* long *in ſo* deep *a* ſilence; *even* hating *the* means, *becauſe* abhorring *the* effects, *of a* Vindication; *and deſiring that what I* built *upon ſuch* controverted ſubjects, *might be* (*like* Solomons Temple) *without the leaſt* noiſe *of* Axe *or* Hammer. *If I had*

had lookt *upon* my self *with so much* reverence, *as to have made my self beleeve I could be* publickly useful, *I would have fasten'd upon a* subject *which should have been* fitter, *and more* easie, *more* profitable *and* pleasant, *and every way more* acceptable *to* my self, *and* others. *I have been very attentive to that preaching of* Siracides, Search not the things that are above thy strength, but what is commanded thee think thereupon with reverence, *&c. And whilest I consider, that* God will render to every man (*not according to his* opinions, *but*) according to his works; *I do not think it so good a task, to make men* orthodox Christians, *as to make them* honest *and* sincere *ones. If I had been one of* those, *who prefer the* Truth *of* opinion *to the* Truth *of* practise, *and hate a man more for the* least Error *of his* Judgement, *then for the* greatest obliquity *of his* Will, *I might indeed have been* forward *on* such *a* Subject. *But because I have* seriously observed, *that whilest men* scamble *too* eagerly *after the* Truth *of* Religion, *they* (*in the* heat *of* Contention) *do* lose *the* practise *of it, I have passed the* hardest censure *upon my present* necessity, *and have been* (*hitherto*) *the* unkindest man *in the* world *to mine* own Publication. *But you* (*Sir*) *are to* thank *me for my* misfortune, *in submission to whose* Judgement, *I have offered* violence *to mine* own. *I may be a* stranger *to my* self *through the* deceitfulnesse *of my* Heart, *but if my* Heart *doth* not deceive *me, no man living hath gone to* Presse *with greater* vanity, *then I go now with* self-denial. *I am sure my* averseness *to this* publication *hath* extorted *from me an* unproportionable length *both of this my* Letter *to* your self, *and of my* Paræneſis *to the* Reader; *which makes a* Portal *too* large *for the* littleness *of the* Cottage *to which it* leads. *Which as I* first submitted

Ecclesiasticus 3. 21, 22, 23.

Rom. 2. 6.

mitted *to your* Judgement, *so must I now* commit *it to your* disposal, *and withal* commend *it to your* Protection. *I say to your* Protection, *because* (*whilest the* Presse *is so* prostituted, *and the* Age *so* prurient) *it is not likely to be the safer for being* innocent. *It was not the* modesty *of* Susanna *that was able to* secure *her from the* Indictment *of the* Elders; *and 'twas the* innocence *of* Joseph, *which made his* Mistresse *pronounce him* guilty. *But had I imagined* (*as I did not*) *that my* private Notes *would have been so* vitiated *and* exposed, *when I deliver'd them as* whispers *into* one *man's* Ear, *I would infallibly have us'd them as* Virginius *did his* vertuous Daughter; *that at least they might have gone* unpolluted out *of the* world. *But since they are unhappily* condemn'd *to* live *in spight of all my endevours to have* suppresst *them*, (Pro supplicio est, non potuisse mori,) *and that* you will *have them* rather *to be shew'd by* me, *in their* natural shape, *then by any* strange *man, in any* uncharitable disguise; *I hope that you will secure me from* farther trouble, *by undertaking its* vindication *against any* pragmatick person, *who shall possibly abuse either* them, *or* me. *For the* temptation *must be* greater, *and the* necessity *more* urgent *then I hope it will be, if I* draw *at either* end *of the* Saw *of* strife. *But you have* leisure *as well as* skill; *and you are able to* forget *your* rank *and* Quality, *in* favour *to* him, *who does honour your* vertues *and* Erudition, *above your* Fortune *and your* Blood. *And who is not more by* obligation *of* Duty, *then by the peculiar inclinations of his Soul, Sir,*

Your most affectionate, obliged,

And humble Servant,

T. P.

A *PARÆNESIS* to the *Reader.*

(*Shewing the* firſt occaſion *of this* following Diſcourſe, *and the* Author's neceſſity *to make it* publick.)

Sect. 1.

THat I am ſubject to *errors*, it is no *humility* to acknowledge; it being no more then to confeſſe, that I carry about me the infirmities of a *man*; which whoſoever doth not, let *him caſt the firſt ſtone at me.* But whether or no I am an *Heretique*, or a *dangerous perſon*, I deſire my *Cenſors* may be my *Judges*; and do therefore addreſſe this preſent *Apologie* and *Appeal*, not to the *kindneſſe* and *partiality* of my deareſt *friends*, but to the very *jealouſies* and *prejudices* of my ſevereſt *enemies.* I bar the ſuffrage of none, but the *accuſer of the Brethren*, that *Abaddon* or *Apollyon*, ſo *very skilfull to deſtroy*, *who is the Father of Lies*, and was *a murderer from the beginning.* Joh. 8. 7. Rev. 12. 10. 9. 11. Joh. 8. 14, 44.

2. I do profeſſe in the preſence of that *punctuall Regiſter* within me, (to which I bear a greater *reverence* then to *affront* it with a premeditated and *wilfull Lie*) that I do not *unſheath* my *Pen*, to *wound* the *reputation* of any man living. But ſince mine own lies *bleeding*

in the mouths of *ſome*, whoſe very *Tongues* have *Teeth*, which *bite* much *harder* then I will ever allow *mine*, (and if there happen to be any in all my papers, I ſhall not think it *painful* to have them *drawn*) it is but needful that I be clothed at leaſt with *armour* of *defence*. I meant indeed at the firſt, only to have *armed* my ſelf with *ſilence*, that my *reſervedneſſe* and *obſcurity* might keep me *ſafe*: and even now that I am *forced* and as it were *drag'd* into the *field*, I contend not for *victory*, but for an *honourable Retreat*. And if after I have ſuffer'd, I may be *competently ſafe*, I will thank my *Buckler*, but not my *Sword*. Even now that I am *writing*, it is with a kinde of *willingneſſe* to *blot* it *out*; and do only *ſo* do it, as preferring an *inconvenience* before a *miſchief*.

3. There had been a *private conference* betwixt a Gentleman and my ſelf, which (for his further ſatisfaction) I threw haſtily into a paper; every whit as *incohærent*, as it had been in our *oral* and *extemporary Diſcourſes*: a Diſcourſe which of neceſſity was forc'd to be without *method* as without *premeditation*; becauſe (in my *anſwers* to his *objections*) I was bound to *follow* after the meaſure that I was *led*. I thought the thing ſo *inconſiderable*, as not to vouchſafe it a *reading over*, but juſt as it was written, delivered it inſtantly to my friend, to be returned (when he had uſed it) unto the *uſual place of my forgetfulneſſe*. And forgotten it was ſo long, that truly I know not how long it was; till diſcourſing with another Gentleman upon the very ſame ſubject, I found my memory awak'd by that *ſleeping ſcribble*; but (forgetting that *ſecrets* do ceaſe to be ſo, when they are *told* though but to *one*, and

that

that with ſtrict conjurations of greateſt *ſecrecy*) I gave him leave to peruſe it as his leiſure ſerv'd him. It ſeems this Gentleman had a *Confident*, as well as I; and ſo my *original* increas'd and multiplied into many falſe copies, of which *not one* was like the *Mother*. Now that my paper went abroad by the help of more *hands* then one, was againſt my *knowledge*, againſt my *will*, againſt my *precept*, againſt my *care*, and laſtly againſt my *beſt endevours* to *recal* it. It having been abſolutely impoſſible, that I ſhould love the *publication* of my *poor Abortive*, who never eſteemed my *ripeſt* and moſt *legitimate productions* to be any way worthy of *publique view*. So far was I from an *ambition* of being known by a *disfigured* and *miſ ſhapen childe*, that when I firſt heard of its *travels*, it was faln out of my *memory*; and when it came to me in a *diſguiſe*, it was quite out of my *knowledge*.

4. I do acknowledge the great *abſtruſeneſſe* of the whole ſubject on which I treated, and the *diſproportion* of my faculties to undertake or manage it. For if the learned Biſhop *Andrewes* did chooſe with S. *Auſtin*, much more may I with Biſhop *Andrewes*, rather to *hear* then to *ſpeak* of theſe *Inſearchables*. I do not hope to fathom either the *Bathos* of the *Apoſtle*, or the *Pſalmiſts Abyſſe*. But I expect to be pardon'd, if when my way is ſlippery, I take heed to my *footing*; and ſo eſchew the *precipice*, as not to run upon the *Wolfe*. It is not the buſineſſe of this *paper*, either to ſtate an *old queſtion* in a *new found way*, or to publiſh my *judgement* as a *conſiderable thing*. *Who* am I, that I ſhould *moderate* between the *Remonſtrants* and *Anti-remonſtrants*?

Epiſc. Winton. in Jud. de art. Lamb.

Rom. 11. 33.

Pſal. 36. 6.

remonſtrants? betwixt S. *Auſtin* and *other Fathers?* betwixt *him* and *himſelf?* betwixt the *Synod* of *Dort*, and that other at *Auguſta?* betwixt the *Dominicans* and the *Jeſuites? Arminius* and Mr. *Perkins? Twiſſe* and *Bellarmine?* or betwixt *Whitaker* and *Baro?* Much indeed may be *excus'd*, becauſe much may be *look't* for, from ſuch reverend Prelates, as were *Overall*, and *Davenant*. But I believe, amongſt the *Clergy* there is not *one* in a *hundred* fit to *ſpeak* of theſe *Myſteries*; and amongſt the *Laity* not *one* in a *thouſand*, that's fit to *hear* them. Hence was that *ſilence* firſt, and afterwards that *ſecrecie*, wherein I fain would have *buried* mine own *conjectures*: and even now that I am *forc'd* to be more publique then I *meant*, (by the many *falſe copies* of my *diſcourſe*, whereof *one* of the *falſeſt* is now preparing for the *preſſe*, by one, who it ſeems is at very *great leiſure*) it is not at all from any *ambition* to be *follow'd*, but from an humble *deſire* to be *rightly underſtood*; and do therefore only pretend to an *Apologie*, and an *Appeal*. Firſt, an *Apologie* for my *imprudence*; that I could think ſuch a ſecret might be communicated to *one*; and ſo betray thoſe *papers* to the *Light*, which belonged only to the *Fire*. Secondly, an *Appeal*, whether I am a *Pelagian*, or whether ſo much as a *Maſſilian*: or whether indeed I am not rather a very *orthodox Proteſtant* of the *Church* of *England*. I have *managed* my *diſcourſe*, as I *ground* my *Faith*, not from the *hidden Myſteries* of God's *ſecret will*, but from the *cleareſt expreſſions* of his *written Word*. Where, of *divers* interpretations, (as often as they are *divers*) I love to pitch upon *that*, which I finde

finde agreed upon by the *wiſeſt* and the *beſt*; and which, in my *ſhallow judgement*, (which yet is the *deepeſt* that I *have*) doth ſeem the *ſafeſt*, and the moſt *ſutable* to the *Analogie of Faith*. Even *Babes* and *Idiots* have this advantage of their *betters*, to be *afraid* of that *fire* where *wiſer* men have been *burnt*. And *ſad experience* hath *taught me*, (who am a *Babe* and an *Idiot* in reſpect of the *aged* and the *wiſe*) to *ſteer aloof* in my *Doctrines* from thoſe fatal *ſhelves* whereon my own *ſmall veſſel* hath been *ſoundly daſhed*, and many others (much *greater*) as it were *ſhipwrackt* before mine *eyes*. This entirely is the reaſon, why I have *hovered* a long time betwixt the *Abſolutenеſſe* of a *Decree*, and the *Liberty* of a *Will*; like a *trembling Needle* betwixt *two Loadſtones*; or rather like a man *newly walking* upon a *Rope*, who ſo *ballanceth* his body with his two *hands*, that his *continual fear* of *falling down* is the only *Tenure* by which he *ſtands*. I dare not, for my life, be ſo *bold* as the *Pelagians*, nor yet ſo bloudy as the *Manichees*. I would not *ſplit* my judgement on the *Symplegades* of *two* intolerable *miſchiefs*, either by robbing God of his *Efficiency* in any *one Act* which is *naturally* good; or by *aſperſing* his *Holineſſe* in any *one Act* which is *morally evill*. I do endevour to keep my ſelf, (and others committed to my *keeping*) both from the *rock* of *Preſumption*, and from the *gulf* of *Deſpair*. I *ſteer* as carefully as I can (in this ſo dangerous *Archipelago*) betwixt the *nature* of *Gods will*, and the *condition* of mine *own*; that ſo my *Confidence* may well conſiſt with my *Hu-*

milityy. I dare not *impute* to *God* what is *unworthy* for him to *own*; nor *arrogate* to my *ſelf* what is *God's peculiar*: and therefore ſettle my *minde* and my *judgement* upon theſe *two Grounds.*

The two Principles *or* Grounds *of my* Belief *in this* buſineſſe.

I. That all the *Evil* of *ſin* which *dwelleth in me*, or *proceedeth from me*, is not imputable to *God's will*, but entirely to *mine own.* The *Serpent* and the *Protoplaſt* were *promoters* of my guilt, but *my God* was no promoter either of *their* guilt or *mine. When the Serpent ſpeaketh a lie, he ſpeaketh of his own; He is the Father of lies, and the works of your father ye will do*, Joh. 8. 44.

II. That *all the good* which I *do*, I do firſt *receive*; not from *any* thing in my *ſelf*, but from the *ſpecial Grace* and *favour* of Almighty God, who *freely* worketh in me, both to *will* and to *do* of his *good pleaſure.* Phil. 2. 13.

CHAP.

Chap. I.

5. IF theſe are *Principles* to be *granted*, my work is done; for theſe are the *Grounds* on which I *build* my judgement, and theſe are the *Touchſtones* by which I *try* it. Whatſoever I beleeve concerning *Election* or *Reprobation*, and thoſe other *Queſtions* which are depending, I do infer from theſe *Truths*, which (as I ſuppoſe) cannot poſſibly *deceive* me. And whileſt I ſtand to theſe *Grounds*, I am not able to *quit* my *judgement*, how little ſoever it ſhall be *liked* by ſuch as are *wittily unreaſonable*. So that my *Principles* be *right*, I care not *whither* they *carry me*, whileſt *Scripture* and my *beſt Care* are both *Guides* in my *conveyance*; for where the *Premiſes* are *true*, the *Concluſion* cannot be *falſe*: all that needeth to be car'd for in the *progreſſe* of my *ſearch*, is the *legality* of the *deduction*; which, if it be *wrong*, I ſhall be glad to hear of it for my *inſtruction*; and if it be *right*, it cannot chooſe but be *Truth* which leaps *naturally* forth from the *womb* of *Truth*.

Sic proponam, ſic aſſeram, ut veritati quæ nec fallit, nec fallitur, ſemper inhæream, ſemper obediens conſentiéns; reperiar. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. ſub init.

6. If by any inadvertency (either in *me*, or the *reader*) my *words* ſeem to *claſh* with my *Belief*, it is by no other misfortune then befell S. *Auſtin*, when he uſed ſuch expreſſions againſt the *Pelagians*, as ſeemed to contradict what he had ſpoken againſt the *Manichees*; and yet he profeſſeth it was not his *judgement*, but his *ſtyle* only that was changed. The ſaying of *Bucer* is remarkable, (and the more becauſe it was *Bucer's*) That *there was no ſuch harm in what was ſaid by the learned, both ancient and modern, concerning the freedome of the Will, if things were taken as they were meant*, (that is to ſay) by the *right handle*: and that would oftner be done, if the *perſons* of ſome men were not a *prejudice* to their *cauſe*: for I finde the *ſame words* may paſſe with *favour* from *one*, which would not be *endured* ſhould they be ſpoken by *another*. One *ſhort example* will not be *burdenſome* to the *Reader*. Doctor *Twiſſe* himſelf hath ſaid expreſly, *That the juſtice of God doth not appear in the abſolute or ſimple condemnation of his creature, but in the condemnation of it for ſin.*

Nec ineſt iis quæ de libero arbitrio Patres quidem & Neoterici aſſeruerunt, ea quam olim non nulli putant impietas, ſi hæc rite modò accipiantur, & ſicut ipſi ſcriptores ea accipi voluerunt. Apud Caſſand. conſult. p. 130.

In præfat. ad Vind. Grat. p. 3.

Thus

Thus he ſpeaketh in his *Preface*, which is moſt of it ſpent againſt *Arminius*. I did but ſay the *ſame words* to ſome *admirers* of Dr. *Twiſſe*, and yet was counted an *Arminian*; which makes me heartily deſire, that I may meet with *unbyas't and impartial Readers*; that whatſoever I ſhall ſay in theſe following papers, may be *compared* with the two *Principles* which I have juſt now *laid*: I diſallowing *all* that *diſagreeth* with thoſe *principles*, as the *unhappineſſe* of my *pen*, or the *unſteadineſſe* of my *brain*. I deſire all may *go* for *no more* then it is *worth*. If I ſeem to any man to be *overtaken in a* Gal. 6. 1. *fault*, he ſhall do well to *reſtore me in the ſpirit of meekneſſe, remembring himſelf leſt he alſo be tempted*. If I am thought to be in the *wrong* by thoſe that think themſelves only in the *right*, they can conclude no worſe of me, then that *I am not infallible*: if in any thing I *erre*, it is for *want* of *apprehenſion*, not my *unwillingneſs* to *apprehend*; nor am I *ſeverely* to be cenſur'd, for being every whit as *dull*, as thoſe *thouſands of thouſands* who have thought as I do. I hope my *Reaſons* will make it appear, that if I erre, I am not *affectedly*, but *invincibly* ignorant; and ſo for being moſt *unpaſſionately*, I am moſt *pardonably erroneous*. Or if I am thought not to be ſo, I deſire one favour from them that ſo think, even that all my faults (whether *real* or *ſuppoſed*) may rather be laid upon my *perſon*, then imputed to my *Cauſe*.

7. Before I come to prove any thing from the *firſt* of my *Principles*, I foreſee a *neceſſity* to *prove* my *Principles* to be *true*; for Prov. 19. 3. *though the fooliſhneſſe of man perverteth his way, yet his heart fretteth againſt the Lord*. There are men in the world of no *ſmall name*, who have told the world both out of the *Pulpit*, and from the *Preſſe*, that *all the evill of ſin* which is *in man* proceedeth from *God* only as the *Author*, and from *Man* only as the *Inſtrument*; whether or no I am deceived, let the *Reader* judge by this following *Catalogue* of *Expreſſions*. I forbear to name the *Authors* in meer *civility* to their *perſons*: but I have them lying by me very particularly *quoted*, and will produce them, if I am challenged by any man's *Doubt* or *Curioſity*. The Expreſſions are ſuch as theſe: (to begin with the mildeſt.)

"That

"That *all things* happen, not only by God's *Præſcience*, but "by his expreſſe *order* and poſitive *Decree*. Whereby many "from the *womb* are *devoted* to certain and *inevitable Deſtru-* "*ction*, that by their miſery God's Name may be glo- "rified. L. 3. c. 23 § 6. p. 324.

"That God directeth his *voice* to ſome men, but that they "may be ſo much the *deafer*; he gives *light* unto them, but "that they may be ſo much the *blinder*; he offers them *in-* "*ſtruction*, but that they may be the more *ignorant*; and he "uſeth a *remedy*, but to the end they may *not* be *healed*. L. 3. c. 24. § 13 p. 333.

"That a wicked man, by the *juſt impulſe* of *God*, doth "that which *is not lawful for him to do*. L. 1. c. 18. § 4. ☜ p. 71.

"That the Devil and wicked men are ſo *reſtrained* on every "ſide with the *hand* of *God*, as with a *bridle*, that they cannot "*conceive*, nor *contrive*, nor *execute* any *miſchief*, nor ſo much "as *endevour* its execution, any farther then God himſelf "doth (not *permit* only, but) *command*: nor are they only "held in *fetters*, but *compelled* alſo as with a *bridle*, to perform "obedience to ſuch commands. L. 1. c. 17. § 12. p. 66. ☜

"That *Theeves* and *Murderers* are the *inſtruments* of the *Divine* "*Providence*, which the Lord himſelf uſeth to execute his "Judgements which he hath determined within himſelf; "and that *he works through them*. L. 1. c. 17. § 5. p. 64.

"That *Gods Decree*, by which any man is deſtined to con- "demnation for ſin, is not an *Act of his Juſtice*, nor doth it *pre-* "*ſuppoſe ſin*. Or if *Damnation* doth *preſuppoſe ſin*, it doth not fol- "low, that the *Præſcience of ſin* doth precede the *Will* or *De-* "*cree* of *Damning*; or if the Will of Damning any man is "an *act of vindicative Juſtice*, it doth not follow that it *præ-* "*ſuppoſeth ſin*. L. 1. part. 1. Digr. 10. c. 1. § 4. p. 125. ☜

"That God can will that man ſhall *not fall*, by his *will* "which Ibid. § 12. p. 140.

" which is called *Voluntas ſigni*, and in the mean while he " can ordain that the ſame man ſhall *infallibly* and *efficacious-* " *ly fall*, by his *Will* which is called *Voluntas beneplaciti*. The ☞ " former *will* of God is improperly called his *will*, for it only " ſignifieth what man *ought* to do by *right*; but the latter " *will* is properly called a *Will*, becauſe by that he decreed what " ſhould [inevitably] come to paſſe.

☞ " That when God *makes* an *Angel* or a *Man* a *Tranſgreſſor*, *In ſerm. de Prov. c 5 & c. 6. & ſic citatur l. 2. part. 1. p. 36.* " he himſelf doth not tranſgreſſe, becauſe he doth not " break a law. The *very ſame ſin*, viz. *Adultery* or *Murder*, " in as much as it is the work of *God* the *Author*, *mover*, and " *compeller*, it is *not* a *crime*; but in as much as it is of *man*, it is " a *wickedneſſe*.

L. 1. c. 18. § 1. p. 68. " That they are cowards and ſeek for *ſubterfuges*, who " ſay that this is done by God's *Permiſſion* only, and not by " his *Will*. If the *excæcation and madneſſe* of *Ahab* is a Judge- ☞ " ment of God, the *fiction* of *bare permiſſion* doth preſently va- " niſh; becauſe it is ridiculous, that the Judge ſhould *only* " *permit*, and not alſo *decree* what he will have done, and alſo " command the execution of it to his Miniſters.

☞ " That God's decree is not leſſe *efficacious* in the permiſſi- *L. 2. part. 1. p. 141, 143, 147, 148, &c.* " on of *Evill*, then in the production of *Good*. (Nay) that " God's will doth paſſe, not only into the *Permiſſion* of the ſin, " but into the *ſin it ſelf* which is *permitted*. (Nay) that the " *Dominicans* do *imperfectly* and *obſcurely* relate the Truth, whileſt ☞ " beſides Gods concurrence to the making way for ſin, they " require nothing but the *negation of efficacious Grace*, when it " is manifeſt, that there is a *farther proſtitution to ſins required*. " (Nay afterwards) that God doth *adminiſter* the occaſions " of ſinning, and do ſo *move* and *urge* them, that they *ſmite* " *the ſinners minde*, and *really affect his Imagination*, according to " all thoſe degrees, whether of *Profit* or *Pleaſure*, repreſented " in them.

If my *hand* were not *weary*, if my *heart* did not *tremble*, if both

both my *ears* did not *tingle*, I could reckon up many more ſuch *frightfull ſayings*, from mine own *knowledge* and *inſpection*, which I have quoted to the very *page*, and can do to the very *line* of their ſeveral Authors: beſides a *cloud* of blaſphemies which I could name from other *compilers*, if I either *liſted* or had *need* to take up any upon *Truſt*. Now by all this it appears, (as well as by many *too literal expoſitions* of ſome Texts in Scripture, which make God (bleſſed for ever!) to be the *Tempter*, the *Deceiver*, and *the Father of Lies*) there is a *neceſſity* lying upon upon me to *prove* my *firſt Principle*, before *ſome Readers* will dare to *truſt* it, *viz.*

That all the Evill of ſin which dwelleth *in me*, is not imputable to *God*'s Will, but entirely of mine *own*. *Adam* and the *Serpent* may be allowed as *ſharers*, but my *God* (bleſſed for ever!) is none at all. *The firſt Principle*

8. This is plain by *Scripture*, and by the Evidences of *Reaſon*: (to which anon I ſhall adde *Antiquity*.) And firſt for *Scripture*, though the force of a *Negative Argument* is not *irrefragable*, yet it is not unworthy to be obſerved, that God is no where affirmed to *Predeſtine ſin*: and therefore the word *Predeſtination* is us'd without any *Epithet*, to ſignifie nothing but *Election* in the ordinary ſenſe: and it is ſet by *Divines* (both ancient and modern) as an oppoſite member to *Reprobation*; which cannot be done from the *bare nature* of the *word*, but from the *Uſe* of it in *Scripture*: and why ſhould that be the *ſole uſe* of it (when the word it ſelf is as *fit* to ſignifie the *contrary*) but becauſe God is the Author of all the *good* we *do*, and of all the good that we *receive*, whereas Man is his own Author of *all* the *Evil* which he *committeth*, and of the *Evil* which he *ſuffereth* for ſuch *commiſſions*? *Proved by Scripture.*

Prædeſtinare Deum homines ad peccata, aut pœnas, in S. Scripturis non dicitur, ſed eos ad vitam æternam prædeſtinare dicitur, quos vocare decernit. Grot. in Riv. Ap. Diſc. p. 52.

Quatuor priores Articuli Lambethani ſunt de Prædeſtinatione, & Reprobatione, *quarum illa ſignificatur* Rom. 11. 33. *hæc* Pſal. 36. 6. Epiſ. Wint. de Artic. Judic.

9. And though this bare *negative Proof* might ſeem ſufficient in ſuch a caſe [that *God doth no where profeſſe he wil's or decrees the ſin of Man*] yet (to make us *inexcuſable* when we

excuſe our ſelves, like *Adam*, by any the leaſt accuſation of him that made us) God doth every where profeſſe, that *he wil's it not*: as when he *forbids* it by his *Lawes*, when he *provides* againſt it by his *Diſcipline*, when he *ſhews* us how to *avoid* it, when he *tels* us he cannot *endure* it, when he *wins* us from it by *Promiſes*, when he *frights* us from it by *Threats*, when he profeſſeth that it is to him both a *Trouble*, and a *Diſhonour*. How doth he *wiſh* that his *People had walked in his wayes?* How doth he *expoſtulate* and make his *Appeal*, whether he had *omitted any thing*, which might tend to the *converſion* of a *ſinful Iſrael?* In the whole 18. chapter of *Ezekiel*, God is pleaſed to make his own *Apologie* and *Appeal*, even to them that had accus'd him in an *unworthy Proverb*: [The Fathers have eaten ſowre Grapes, and the childrens Teeth are ſet on edge] *Are not my waies equal?* and *are not your waies unequal*? Sure *their* waies had been *his*, if he had *abſolutely contriv'd them*. *The ſoul that ſinneth it ſhall die*, verſ. 4. *And why will ye die O houſe of Iſrael?* verſ. 31. Which was virtually to aske them, *why they would ſin too*; which they *ought* to have done, if he had *will'd* it: for the poſitive *will* of God *muſt* and *ought* to be *done*; and *can* any man be *puniſht* for doing that which he *muſt*? *Muſt* any man be *puniſht* for doing that which he *ought*? 'Tis but an ill κρυπτούγκτον (which ſome men uſe) to ſay that God hath a *double Will*, of which the one is *ſecret*, and the other *revealed*; the revealed will not only *diverſe*, but even *oppoſite* to the *ſecret* one: God *ordaining* ſin with the *one*, whileſt he *forbids* it with the *other*; and not alwaies *willing in ſecret* what he *reveals* himſelf to *be willing to*, for this is a *Salve* (ἕλκος φαῦλον φάρμακον) a great deal worſe then the *wound* which it fain would *cure*. Gods *will* indeed is divided amongſt *orthodox Divines* in reſpect of *ſeveral Acts*, and in *relation* to *ſeveral objects*, or to the very ſame object at *ſeveral Times*, and in *ſeveral Qualifications*, into his *firſt will*, and his *ſecond will*, his *antecedent* and *conſequent*, his *ſecret* and *revealed* will: but to affirm *two wils* in *ſimplicity it ſelf*, the one *contrariant* to the other about the very *ſame act*, (the one *decreeing* that *very act* which is *prohibited* by the other) ſeemeth a greater blaſphemy to *me*, then that which the *Gnoſticks*, and the

Pſal. 81. 13.
Iſa. 5. 3, 4.
Ezek. 18. Verſ. 2, 29.

Θέλημα τριττὸν, τὸ μὴ ἁπλοῦν ἡμαρτηκότας. Σύλλημα διὸ τρεῖς, τὸ πλοκὸν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν. Chryſoſt. in c. 1. ad Eph. Homil. 1. p. 1036.

the *Marcionites*, and the *Manichees* were guilty of, when they affirmed *two Gods*, as the different Fountains of *Good* and *Evil*. For by what I finde in *Tertullian* (who was best acquainted with *Marcion*'s Hereſies) thoſe *two Principles* of *Good* and *Evil* were found out as a *Refuge* for thoſe *other opinions*, againſt which it is, that this my *Scribble* was firſt deſign'd. And what *Tertullian* ſpeaks againſt *Marcion*, might very well be repeated againſt the *Abſolute Reprobatarians*: it having been better and more reaſonable (in that *Father's Judgement*) that God ſhould *never* have *forbid* what he *determin'd* ſhould be *done*, then that he ſhould *determine* to be *done* what he *forbid*. And ſo 'tis the *leſſer blaſphemy* of the two, to aſcribe *Holineſſe* to one principle, and *Unholineſſe* to another (in the *Marcionite*'s ſenſe) then *both* to *him* who is the *Spirit of Holineſſe*; who therefore cannot ſo *irreſpectively* decree the *puniſhment* of his *Creature*, as to *neceſſitate* his *ſin*, and ſo be the *Author* of his *Impenitence*.

Auguſtin. Hæreſ. 6. Tertull. adverſus Mar. l. 1, c. 1.

Duos Deos adfert tanquam duas Symplegadas naufragii ſui.

Quis iſte Deus tam bonus, ut ab illo malus fiat? ibid. c 23.

Ibid. c. 26.

10. *Let no man ſay then when he is tempted, I am tempted of God* (as our modern *Ranters* are wont to do) *for every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own luſt and enticed.* So far is God from being the Author of any man's ſin, that *he is Faithfull* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *and will not ſuffer us to be tempted above what we are able*, but *will be* ſure to *make a way* either for *conqueſt*, or for *eſcape*. I dare not ſay then (with *him* in the *Comedian*, who had been a *great ſinner*) *Quid ſi hæc quiſpiam voluit Deus? What if ſome God hath ſo decree'd it?* for S. *James* makes me believe, that ſin is both *ingendred* and *conceived* within me: when my *luſt* hath *conceived*, it *bringeth forth ſin*: and if my *Luſt* is the *Mother* of it, ſure the *Father* is my *Will*. It was *David*'s ſaying of wicked *Iſrael*, *that they provok'd God to anger* (not with *his will*, but) *with their own Inventions*: there are *Contrivers of miſchief*, (Pſ. 58. 2) *Deviſers of lies*, (Eccleſ. 7. 13.) ſuch *as weary themſelves to commit iniquity* (Jer. 9. 5.) Which cannot poſſibly be imputed unto an *abſolute decree*. How many *Volumes* have been written *De arte Magica? De arte Meretricia? De arte Lenonum?* with ſuch others as would *bluſh* to be nam'd in *Engliſh*; and dare we ſay they are *decreed*, to be *Myſteriouſly wicked?* or that their

Jam. 1. 13, 14.

1 Cor. 10. 13.

Terent. in Eunuch.

Jam. 1. 15.

Pſ. 106. 29.

Vide Cornel. Agrip. de vanit. ſcient.

deſtruction was *irreſpective*, and *unconditionall*? I am in ſuch *diſorder* and *diſcompoſedneſſe* of minde, whileſt I only *repeat* theſe *bold expreſſions*, that were it not to *good* purpoſe (as I conjecture and intend) I *durſt* not *venture* to *repeat* them.

Dan 9. 7. *O Lord, righteouſneſſe belongeth unto thee, but unto us confuſion of*
Eccleſ. 7. 29. *face.* For *thou haſt made man upright, but we have found out many inventions.*

Proved ſecondly by Reaſon. After *Scripture* I come to *Reaſon*; by which I hope to make it appear, that God Almighty is ſo far from being *Acceſſary* to ſin, and does ſo many things to *hinder* it, that he doth not *permit* it but in an *æquitable ſenſe*: and amongſt many reaſons which may be given, I ſhall (in *civility* to my *reader*, and for the *love* of *brevity*) content my ſelf with *that one*, which to my ſeeming is the *beſt*; and I the rather think it the *beſt*, becauſe I ground it upon a notion which I have

Hooker Eccl. Polit. l. 1. formerly learnt from *moſt judicious Mr. Hooker*: That which *aſſigns* to every thing the *kinde*, that which *moderates* the *power*, and *appoints* the *form* and *meaſure* of working, that we properly call a *Law*. Hence the *being* of God is a kinde of *Law* to his *working*; becauſe that *perfection* which God *is*, giveth *perfection* to that he *doth*. So that *being* nothing but what is *good*, he can *work* nothing that is *otherwiſe*. It is therefore an *errour* (ſaith that *Man of judgement*) to think there is no *Reaſon* for the works of God, beſides his *abſolute will*, (although no reaſon is known to *us*) for the Apoſtle tels us, *he worketh all things* (not *ſimply* and *meerly* according to his

Eph. 1. 11. *will*, but) κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, *according to the Counſel of his will*: and becauſe he doth *voluntarily* ſet himſelf a *Law* whereby to work, it followes that that *Law* is no abatement to his *freedome*. If he is pleas'd to ſet himſelf a *Law* or *Rule*, not to reprobate any but upon *præſcience* of *ſin*, (becauſe that is moſt conformable to the *nature* of his *goodneſſe*) can this be any præjudice to the *perfection* of his *being*? Is his *nature* the leſſe *abſolute*, becauſe it pleaſes him that his *will* be *conditionall* in *ſome* things, as it is *abſolute* in *others*? Does he *loſe* any *prærogative*, by being *unable* to be the *Author of ſin*? Or is not that rather a very great *Argument* of his *Power*? ſuch an *ability* as that being meer

Infirmity.

Infirmity. *We* are *God's* Creatures, but *ſin* is ours. *God ſaw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good.* We ſee the things that are made by the *Fiat* of our *will*, and behold they are very *evil.* This *Creative power* of *ours* we juſtly reckon as the ſequel of *humane weakneſſe*, and ſhall we heedleſly affirm it to be a *Jewel* in the glorious *diadem* of *God's Almightineſſe?* The Apoſtle indeed hath told us, *that God worketh all things*, (Eph. 1. 11.) but firſt he ſpeaks it of God's *Election* which he *prædeſtin'd* in his *Son*, and the means conducing to ſuch *an end*, which are none but *good*; not at all of *Reprobation*, the *means* in order to which are none but *evill.* Secondly, even * *Beza* himſelf doth ſo interpret that place, as not to *annihilate*, or *ſtupefie*, but rather to ſtrengthen and to *rectifie* our *wils.* God makes an *ill will* a *good one*, not *no will* at all; (as * *Beza* elſewhere ſpeaks, and it were heartily to be wiſht that he had never ſpoke otherwiſe) according to that of *Auſtin*, *Ex nolentibus facit volentes.* He ſaies *facit*, not *adigit*, *cogit*, *compellit.* He *makes* us willing *who were unwilling*, but does not *force* us to be willing *whileſt we are* unwilling; (that is to ſay, to be *willing againſt* our *wils*, or *whether we will or no.*)

Gen. 1. 31.

* *Nec tamen idcirco ſumas ſtipites; ea enim nobis ut velimus & poſſimus concedit.* Beza. in Eph. 1. 11.

* *Bene volumus, non quidem naturâ, ſed quia Deus ex malâ voluntate bonam fecit.* Ad Philip. 2. 13.

12. But I finde that I have *ſhot* ſomewhat farther then I *aim'd*; it being only my deſign, and the proper buſineſſe of this place, to ſhew, that the words of the Apoſtle, [*he worketh all things*] are infinitely far from being meant either of *ſin*, or *Reprobation.* So far from that, that God Almighty does not *permit* ſin, as *permiſſion* ſignifies *connivence* or *conſent*; but he *permits* it, as that ſignifies [*not to hinder by main force.*] If I ſee a man ſtealing and ſay nothing to him, I ſo *permit* as to be *guilty*: but if I *warn* and *exhort*, if I *promiſe* and *threaten*, and do all that may avert him (beſides *killing* him) I ſo *permit* as to be *innocent.* In like manner, all that is done by God Almighty by way of *permiſſion*, is his ſuffering us to *live*, and have that *nature* of the *will* with which he *made* us. Whereas *to deſtroy us* for the prevention of ſin, or to make us become *ſtocks* (as *Beza* phraſes it) or like *wooden Engines*, (which are moved only by *wires* at the *meer pleaſure* and diſcretion of the *Engineer*) were by inevitable conſequence to * *uncreate* his *Creature*, which to do were repugnant

* *Liberum & ſui arbitrii & ſuæ poteſtatis invenio hominem à Deo inſtitutum; nullam magis Imaginem & ſimilitudinem Dei in illo animadvertens, quàm ejuſmodi ſtatus formam.* Tertull. adverſ. Marc. lib. 2. c. 5. ſee alſo cap. 6, 7.

nant to his immutability, as *Tertul.* ſhewes. This is all that I am able to *apprehend*, or *pronounce*, [that God *permits* our *ſins* in *this ſenſe only*; and that he *diſpoſes* and *orders* them to the *beſt advantage*.]

13. Having proved my *firſt Principle* by *Scripture* and *Reaſon*, it will be as eaſie to confirm it by the *common ſuffrage* of *Antiquity*; and to avoid the Repetition of ſo long a Catalogue, which I ſuppoſe will be as *needleſſe*, as I am ſure it will be *nauſeous* to a *conſiderable Reader*, I refer him to the Citations which will follow my *firſt inference Sect.* 18. I will content my ſelf at preſent to ſhut up all with that *Article* of the *Auguſtan Confeſſion*, (to which our 39 *Articles* have the greateſt *regard* and *conformity*, and which for that very reaſon is to me the moſt venerable of any *Proteſtant Confeſſion* except *our own*) That *though God is the Creator and Preſerver of Nature, yet the only cauſe of ſin is the will of the wicked (that is to ſay, of the Devil and ungodly men) turning it ſelf from God to other things againſt the (will and) commandements of God.* And the *Orange Synod* doth pronounce an *Anathema* upon all that think otherwiſe.

Proved by Antiquity § 18.

Tametſi Deus creat & conſervat Naturam, tamen cauſa peccati eſt voluntas malorum viz. Diaboli & impiorum hominum quæ avertit ſe à Deo ad alias res, contra mandata Dei. Auguſt. Confeſſ. Artic. 9.

Aliquos ad malum divinâ poteſtate præordinatos eſſe, non ſolùm non credimus, ſed etiam ſi ſint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni deteſtatione in illis Anathema dicimus. Synod. Araufic. Can. 25.

If any will not ſubſcribe to this *Confeſſion*, I will leave him to learn *modeſty* both from *Arrian* the *Heathen*, and from *Philo* the *Jew*.

Εκσίησαι ὑπ' ἄλλε μὴ ἀλνὸς, ὑπὸ σ'αὐῖῦ δέ. *Arrian. in Epictet.*

Εἰμαρμένην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην ἀποπλασάμενοι, ἀπιθείας πολλῆς κατέπλησαν τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. *Philo* περὶ ἀποικίας τῆ 'Αβραάμ. p. 325.

CHAP.

Chap. II.

MY first *Demand* being fully *granted* (as in the *Mathematicks* 'tis usual to *build* upon certain *Postulata*) it doth immediately follow, that [*man himself is the sole efficient cause of his eternal punishment*] (I say the *sole Cause*, as excluding *God*, but not the *Devil*; whom yet I also exclude from the *efficiency of the Cause*; because he can only *incite*, and *propose objects*, and adde *perswasions* to sin, but cannot *force* or *cause* it in me without my *will* and *consent*: so that the Devil being only a *Tempter* and *Perswader*, cannot for that be justly styled an *efficient*. Or if he were, sure for that very Reason God himself cannot be so: but only *Man* and the *Devil* must be the *Concauses* of man's *Destruction*.) Which is the second thing I am to prove both by *Scripture*, and *Reason*, and the whole *suffrage* of *Antiquity*.

The first Inference.

Ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ. οὐκ ὅτι τοῦ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ὁ Διάβολος αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πονηροὺς γεγονέναι, ὅσῳ ἐκ τρόπων γίνεται.

Ammonius in Joh. 8.

Our selves we condemn as the only causes of our own misery.

Hook. l. 5. § 72.

15. And sure I shall not be so solicitous as to rifle my *Concordance*, but make use of such Scriptures as lye uppermost in my *memory*, and so are readiest to *meet* my pen. These I finde are of two sorts, *negative* on *God's* part, and *affirmative* on *man's*. God gives the first under his *oath*. (Ezek. 33. 11.) *As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your wicked waies, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?* In the 18. *chapter* of the same *Prophesie*, the *Latine* translation is more *emphatical* then the *English*: for there it is not [*non cupio*] but [*nolo mortem morientis*] not that he doth *not will* the death of a sinner, but *that he wils it not*; he doth not only *not desire it*, but (which makes the proof more forcible) he *desires the contrary*, even *that he should turn from his wickednesse and live*: (*chap.* 33. *v.* 14.) *not willing* (saith S. *Peter*) *that any should perish, but* (on the contrary) *that all should come to Repentance*. And so (1 Tim. 2. 4.) *He will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth*. Where it appears by the Context, that the Apostle does not only speak of *all kindes* of

Proved by Scripture.

In the negative.

Ezek. 33. 11.

C. 18. v. 32.

2 Pet. 3. 9.

par-

particulars, but of *all particulars* of the *kindes* too: For he first of all exhorts them, that *prayers, and supplication, and giving of thanks be made for all men*, (verſ. 1.) Secondly, he does *inſtance* in one *ſort* of men, *for Kings and all that are in Authority*, (verſ. 2.) Thirdly, he addes the *Cauſe* of his exhortation, *for this is good and acceptable in the ſight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be ſaved*, (verſ. 3, 4.) And if the *Spaniſh Frier* ſaid true, *that few Kings go to hell*, (giving this Reaſon) *becauſe all Kings are but few*, the *Apoſtles* way of arguing will be ſo much the *ſtronger*; for when he ſpeaks of *all men* in generall, he makes his inſtance in *Kings*, in *all Kings without exception*, thereby intimating *Nero* the *worſt of Kings*, under whom at that time the *Apoſtle liv'd*. And he uſes another argument (verſ. 6.) becauſe Chriſt *gave himſelf a Ranſome for all*. This is yet more plain from Rom. 2. 4, 5. *Deſpiſeſt thou the riches of his goodneſſe, and forbearance, and long-ſuffering, not knowing that the goodneſſe of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardneſſe and impenitent heart treaſureſt up unto thy ſelf wrath againſt the day of wrath?* Obſerve who they are whom God would have to *repent*; even the *hard hearted* and the *impenitent*. But I have ſtronger proofs out of Scripture, and *leſſe liable* to *Cavil* then any of theſe, which yet I thought fit to uſe, becauſe I finde they are the *Chief* of thoſe that *Voſſius* relies upon, and expounds to my purpoſe from the *Authority* of the *Ancients*. I will adde to theſe but three or four Texts more, of which the one will ſo *eſtabliſh* and *explain* the other, as to leave no place of evaſion to the gainſayer. Firſt our bleſſed Saviour is call'd by the Apoſtle, *the Saviour of all men, eſpecially of them that beleeve*, (1 *Tim.* 4. 10.) as if the Apoſtle had *foreſeen* an objection, that the word [*all*] might be reſtrained unto the *houſhold of Faith*, he prevents it by a diſtinction of *general* and *ſpecial*: for if he is a *ſpecial Saviour of beleevers*, he is a *general Saviour* of thoſe that are *unbeleevers*; not that *unbeleevers* can be ſaved, whileſt they are *obſtinate unbeleevers*, but upon *Condition* they will *repent and beleeve*: elſe why ſhould the Apoſtle affirm the *Saviour* to be of *all*, and then come off with an [*eſpecially*] to them that *beleeve?* Certainly if it is

Rom. 2. 5.

Veteris hæc Eccleſiæ ſententia fuit, velle Deum converſionem ad ſalutem omnium, non tantùm genera ſingulorum, ſed ſingulos generum intelligens. Gerard. Voſſ. in Pelag. Hiſt. l. 6. Theſ. 2.

1 Tim. 4. 10.

every

every man's duty to *beleeve in* Christ, Christ *dyed for every man.* And this very argument is not easily answered in the very confession of Dr. *Twisse*; who yet by and by saies 'tis easily answered, and yet he leaves it without an answer, he only *scornes* it and lets it *passe*. *Twiss. in Respon. ad Armin. Præfat. p.* 16. *col.* 2. This is secondly confirm'd from the Apostle's way of arguing (2 *Cor.* 5. 14.) *If one died for all, then were all dead.* This is the *major Propositon* of a *hypothetical syllogisme*; in which the thing to *be proved* is, *that all were dead*; and the *Medium* to *prove* it is, *that one died for all.* Now every man knows (that understands how to reason) that the *argument of proof* must be rather *more*, then lesse known, then the thing *in question* to be proved: so that if it be *clear*, that *all men were dead* by the fall of the *first Adam*, it must be *clearer* (as S. *Paul* argues) that *life was offered unto all*, by the death of the *second Adam*; and if none were *died for* but the *Elect*, then the *Elect* only were *dead*: for the word [*all*] must signifie as *amply* in the *Assumption*, as it does in the *Sequel*; or else the *Reasoning* will be *fallacious* and *imperfect*: The Apostle thus argues, 2 Cor. 5. 14.

If one died for all, then were all dead;
But one died for all; (*that must be the Assumption*)
Therefore all were dead.

Whosoever here denies the *Minor*, does (before he is aware) condemn the *Sequel* of the *Major*; and so gives the *Lie* to the very words of the *Text*; which I can look from none but some *impure Helvidius*, who would conclude the greatest *falshoods* from the word of *Truth.* This is thirdly confirmed from the saying of the Apostle, (*Rom.* 11. 32.) *that God concluded all in unbelief* (the *Gentiles* first, vers. 30. and afterwards the *Jewes*, vers. 31.) *that he might have mercy upon all*; from whence I inferre, that if this last [*all*] belong to *none* but the *Elect*, then none but the *Elect* were concluded in *unbelief.* But 'tis plain that *all* without *exception* were (first or last) concluded in *unbelief*, therefore the *mercy* was meant to *all* without *exception.* Lastly, it is confirm'd from those *false Prophets and false Teachers*, (2 *Pet.* 2. 1.) who though *privily bringing in damnable heresies, even denying* Rom. 11. 32. 2 Pet. 2. 1.

the Lord that bought them, and bringing upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction, yet it ſeems they were ſuch whom *the Lord had bought*. So far is God from being the *Cauſe* of mans *deſtruction*, by an *abſolute, irreſpective, unconditional Decree*, that he gave himſelf a *ranſome* even for them *that periſh*. They were not left out of the *bargain* which was made with his *Juſtice*, but the Apoſtle tels us they were actually *bought*: He whoſe *blood* was *ſufficient* for a *thouſand worlds*, would not grudge its *extent* to the *major part* of but *one*: he was *merciful* to *all men*, but the *greateſt part* of *men* are *unmerciful* to *themſelves*. He is the *Saviour of all*, but yet all are *not ſaved*; becauſe he only *offers*, does not *obtrude* himſelf upon us. He * *offers* himſelf to *all*, but *moſt refuſe* to *receive* him. He will have *no man* to periſh, but repent by his *Antecedent will*, but by his *Conſequent will* he will have every man periſh that is *impenitent*. Which is ſufficient to have been ſaid for the *negative part* of my undertaking, [*That the cauſe of Damnation is not on God's part*] in which, if any one Text be found of power to *Convince*, let no man cavil at thoſe others which ſeem *leſſe* Convincing. If any one hath an objection, let him ſtay for an anſwer till his objection is urged. It might ſeem too eaſie, to *ſolve objections* of my *own choice*, or *confute* an *argument* of my *own making*; and therefore I paſſe (without notice of common ſhifts, and ſubterfuges, till I am call'd to that *Drudgery*) to the *ſecond part* of my enterpriſe, which is the *affirmative*.

* *Gratiam ſalutarem non exiſtimo* conferri *omnibus, ſed tamen omnibus* offerri; *& præſto eſſe Deum ut conferatur.* Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Lamb.

Omnibus offertur Dei miſericordia. Nemo illius expers eſt, niſi qui renuit. Bernard. ſerm. 1. in purif. Mar.

16. *In the Affirmative.*

[*That man himſelf is the cauſe of his eternal puniſhment.*] Which though ſuppoſed in the *negative*, muſt yet be proved to ſome perſons, who are prevailed upon by *faſhions*, and *modes* of ſpeech; and will *deny* that very thing when they ſee it in *one colour*, which they will preſently *aſſent* to, when they behold it in *another*. He who is very loth to ſay, that *God is the Author of ſin and damnation*, will many times ſay it in *other terms*; and therefore, in *other terms*, it muſt be proved that *he is not*. *O Iſrael thou haſt deſtroyed thy ſelf, but in me is thine help*, (*Hoſea* 13. 6.) They that privily bring in Damnable Hereſies *ſhall bring upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction*. *The fooliſhneſſe of man perverteth his way*: and as when *luſt conceiveth it bringeth*

Hoſ. 13. 6.
2. Pet. 2. 1.
Prov. 19. 3.

bringeth forth ſin, ſo *when ſin is finiſhed it bringeth forth death*, (*Jam.* 1. 15.) If death is that *monſter*, of which ſin is the *Dam*, that *brings it forth*, how *foul* a thing muſt be the *Sire*? and can there be any greater *blaſphemy*, then to bring God's *Providence* into the *pedegree* of *Death*? *Death* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *is the wages of ſin*, (*Rom.* 6. 23.) And *wages* is not an *abſolute* but a *relative* word. It is but reaſon he ſhould be *paid* it, who hath dearly *earn'd* it by his *work*. It is the *will* of man that is *the ſervant of ſin*. *Diſobedience* is the *work*, *Death* eternal is the *wages*, and the *Devil* is the *pay-maſter*; who as he *ſets* men to *work* to the *diſhonour* of their *Creator*, ſo he *paies* them their wages to the advancement of his *glory*. From whence I Conclude (with the *Book* of *Wiſdome*) *God made not death, neither hath he pleaſure in the deſtruction of the living: for he created all things that they might have their being, and the generations of the world were healthful, and there is no poyſon of Deſtruction in them, nor the kingdome of death upon the earth. But ungodly men with their words and works call'd it to them, and made a Covenant with it*; becauſe they are unworthy to take [μερίδα] *part* with it.

Jam. 1. 15.

Rom. 6. 23.

Verſ. 20.

Wiſd. 1 13, 14, 15, 16.

17. I will confirm this truth by no more then one Reaſon; which, if it is not the *beſt*, doth ſeem to me to be the *fitteſt*; as being apteſt to evince both the *connexion* and *neceſſity* of my *firſt inference*, from my *firſt Principle*. It is taken from the *nature* and *uſe* of *Puniſhment*; which as ſoon as it is nam'd, doth *preſuppoſe* a *Guilt*; for as every *ſin* is the * *tranſgreſſion of ſome Law*, ſo every *puniſhment* is the *revenge* of ſome *ſin*: upon which it followes, that if a mans *ſin is from himſelf*, 'tis *from himſelf* that *he is puniſht*. And as the *Law* is not the *Cauſe*, but the * *Occaſion* only of ſin; ſo God is not the *Cauſe*, but the *inflicter* only of *puniſhment*: for ſo ſaies the Apoſtle, *Sin taking occaſion by the Commandement wrought in me all manner of Concupiſcence: for without the Law ſin was dead. That which is good not being made death, but ſin working death by that which is good.* God and his *Law*, are, each of them, the *Cauſa-ſine-qua-non*, the *Condition without which*, ſin and puniſhment could not have been, (for *without* Law *no ſin*, and *without God no Reprobation*) but not the *Energetical efficient Cauſe*, of which ſin and puniſhment

Proved ſecondly by Reaſon.

* Ἀνομία.

* Rom. 7. 8.

Verſ. 13.

nishment were the *necessary effects*. For if God had made a *Hell* by an *absolute purpose*, meerly because *he would* that *some* should *suffer* it; and not in a *prævious intuition* of their sins; *Damnation* had been a *Misery*, but not a *Punishment*: as if a *Potter* makes a *vessel* on purpose that he may *break it*, (which yet none but a mad man can be thought to do) or if a man meerly for *recreation* cuts up *Animals alive*, (which yet none ever did that I can hear of, except a *young Spanish Prince*) it is an *Infelicity* and a *torment*, but no more a *punishment* then it is *any thing else*. Indeed the *Common people*, who do not understand the *just propriety of words*, make no distinction many times betwixt *Pain*, and *Punishment*; not considering that *Punishment* is a *Relative word*; of which the *correlative* is *Breach of Law*; and therefore is fitly exprest in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a *Parent and a Childe*: when lust hath *conceived* it *bringeth forth* sin; sin being perfected *bringeth forth death*; * (*Jam.* 1. 15.) which is as much as to say (according to the *propriety* of the *Apostles words*) *sin is the parent, and death is the childe*. Now there cannot be a *Childe without* a *parent*; (for they are *relata secundum esse*) much lesse can the childe be *before* the parent; (for *sunt simul naturâ, & dicuntur ad convertentiam*) Upon which it followes, that *punishment* could not be *ordained* by God, either *without* sin or *before it*, or *without respect and intuition* of it, (which yet the great * Mr. *Calvin* does plainly say.) I say it *could not*, because it implies a *contradiction*. For though God could easily make *Adam* out of the *earth*, and the *earth* out of *nothing*, yet he could not make a *sinful Cain* to be the *son* of *sinful Adam*, *before* there was an *Adam*, much lesse before there was a *sinful one*: because it were to *be*, and *not to be* at the same time; *Adam* would be a *Cause*, before an *entity*; which God Almighty *cannot* do, because he is *Almighty*. So that when the *Romanists* assert their *Transubstantiation*, or *the posterity of Marcion* their *Absolute decree* of *all* the *evil* in the *world*, (both pretending a *Reverence* to God's *omnipotence*) they do as good as say, *those things which are true may therefore be false, because they are true*; or that God is *so Almighty, as to be able not to be God*: that being the Result of an *Ability*, to *make*

two

* Jam 1. 15. Συλλαβοῦσα. Τίκτει. Ἀποκυεῖ. Τὴν λητὼ ἀποκυῆσαι. *Apud Lucianum dr.*

* *Ideo præsciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinavit.* and for no other reason, *Nisi quia Deo ita visum est.* Calvin. Instit. l. 3. cap. 23. p. 7.

Non percipit se dicere, ea quæ vera sunt, eo ipso quòd vera sunt, falsa sint. August. contra Faustum.

Οὐ δύναται ἀισχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός. *Origen. contra Celsum. l. 4.*

two parts of a contradiction true: (so said *Austin* against S. *Faustus*, and *Origen* against *Celsus*.) Whensoever it is said, [*God can do all things*] 'tis meant of *all things that become him.* So *Isidore* the *Pelusiote*. But (to return to argument in the pursuit of which I have stept somewhat too forward) if Gods *præordination* of mans *eternal misery* were in order of nature *before* his *præscience* of mans *sin*, as Mr. *Calvin* evidently affirms in his [Ideo * *præsciverit*, quia *decreto suo præordinavit*,] setting *Præordination* as the *Cause*, or *Reason*, or *prævious Requisite* to his *Præscience*) either mans *Reprobation* must come to passe *without sin*, or else he must sin to bring it *orderly to passe*; which is to make God the author either of *misery by it self* without relation to sin, or else of *sin* in *order* to *misery*. The first cannot be, because God hath * sworn, he *hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner*, (*Ezek.* 33. 14.) much lesse in *his death* that *never sin'd*. And because, if it were *so*, the Scripture would not use the word *Wages*, and the word *Punishment*, and the word *Retribution*, and the word *Reward*. *Hell* indeed had been a *Torment*, but not a *Recompence*; a *fatal Misery*, but not a *Mulct*; an *Act of power*, but not of *vengeance*; which yet in many places is the *style* that *God speaks in*, *Vengeance* is mine, and I will *repay*, *Rom.* 12. 19. Nor can the *second* be lesse impossible, it having formerly been proved, that God is not the Author of sin; * *he hath no need of the sinful man*, whereby to bring mans *Ruine* the more *conveniently about*; and most of them that dare say it, are fain to say it in a *Disguise*. Some indeed are for [*ligonem ligonem*] but the more *modest blasphemers* are glad to dresse it in *cleaner phrase*. A strange προθύστερον in Divinity, to put the [1] *childe before the parent*, the [2] *wages before the work*, the [3] *end before the means*, the *Reprobation before the sin*! yet so they do who make the *Decree* of *Reprobation* most *irrespective* and *unconditional*; and after that, say, that *whom God determines to the end, he determines to the means*. To *put the horse upon the Bridle*, is a more *rational Hypallage*: for by this Divinity, eternal punishment is imputed to Gods *Antecedent will* (which is called the *first*) and *sin* to his *consequent will*, (which is the *second*.) The first προηγουμένως, and the other only ἑπομένως, punishment *chiefly*, and sin by way of *Consecution*. Men are bid

Isidorus Pelusiota quærenti, εἰ Θεῷ πάντα δυνατά, respondit, πάντα τὰ πρέποντα αὐτῷ.

* *Loco superiùs paulò citato.*

* *Idcirco jurat, ut si non credimus promittenti Deo, credamus saltem pro salute juranti.* Hieron. Epist. 46.

O beatos nos, quorum causa Deus jurat! O miserrimos si nec juranti credimus! Tertul. l. de Pœnit. cap. 4.

* Eccles. 15. 12.

1 Jam. 1. 15.
2 Rom. 6. 23.
3 Rom. 6. 2[illegible].

bid not to sin *ex voluntate signi*, or *revelata*; but are determin'd to it *ex voluntate occultâ*, or *beneplaciti*. *Distinctions* very *good*, when at first they were invented for *better uses*. The former by S. *Chrysostome*, from whom it was *borrow'd* by *Damascene*, and from him by the *Schoolmen*. But I say they all were us'd to very contrary purposes, by *them*, and by *these*, who endevour'd to *repel* those Fathers with their own *weapons*, (as the elaborate *Gerard Vossius* does very largely make it appear.) I am sorry I must say, (what yet I *must* (saith * *Tertullian*) when it *may tend to edification*) That the *Lord God merciful*, and *gracious*, *long-suffering*, *abundant in goodnesse and truth*, who is *all Bowels* and no gall, who *hateth nothing that he hath made*, who in the *midst of Judgement remembreth mercy*, ever *forgiving iniquity*, *transgression and sin*, is exhibited to the world by the *Authors* and *Abettors* of *unconditional Reprobation*, as a *kinde of Platonick Lover of* so *excellent* a *Creature's everlasting misery*. Which if Mr. *Calvin* himself *confessed* to be a * *Horrible Decree* (who yet *beleev'd* it) how *frightful* must that opinion appear to *me*, who did therefore *leave* it, because it *frighted* me *into my wits?* For to say that God is ἀνθρωπεκτόνος, *a slayer of men* from *all eternity*, (who is *the Lamb slain*, that is, *a Saviour*, *from the foundation of the world*, (*Rev.* 13. 8.) is to affirm *that* of *him*, which he affirmed of the *Devil*, who is called by our *Saviour*, *A Murderer from the beginning*, *Joh.* 4. 44. Which the Devil could not be, if God had *absolutely willed* the *Death* of any, without *respect* or *relation* to the *snares* of the *Devil*, it being impossible to *murder the Dead*; or to *slay* those that were *killed* long *before* they were *born*. I know by whom it is answered, [That God doth *will sin*, not as it is sin, but as it is a *Medium* for the setting forth of his *Glory*; and so *Damnation*.] But whilest men *finde* out *Distinctions* to *excuse* God Almighty, they do imply him to have *offended*. Which I am so *weary* even to *think on*, that I hasten, for some *refreshment*, to my *third proof* of this *Inference*, from the *suffrage* of *Antiquity*.

Poterit Deus velle voluntate signi & approbante, ut homo non labatur; interea voluntate beneplaciti statuere potest gratiam efficacem negare, ex quo infallibiliter & efficaciter sequetur ut labatur. Twiss. in vind. Grat. l. 1. de præd. § 12. p. 140.

Voss. Pelag. Hist. l. 6. Thes. 2.

* *Quod dicere periculosum, ad ædificationem proferendum est.* Tertul. de pœn. cap. 5.

* *Decretum horribile quidem fateor, inficiari tamen nemo poterit.* Calvin. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. § 7.

L. 1. part. 1. § 13. p. 140.

18. Before I name any particular, I will take the confidence to say in general, That all the *Greek* and *Latine Fathers before*

Proved thirdly by Antiquity.

fore S. *Austin*, and even *Austin* himself before his contention against *Pelagius*, (and even during that contention in some *places* of his *works*) besides those *many Fathers* who lived *after him*, were *unanimously* of this Judgement, *That God did not absolutely decree the Reprobation of any Creature, but upon præscience and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence.* I have not liv'd long enough to read them all, but I have *dipt* into the *most*: and by the help of such *Collectors* as I have gotten into my Study, (whereof *Vossius* hath good reason to be the Chief upon *this occasion*: and I the rather use *him*, because I find him so very punctual in every one of the quotations, which I have had *means* and *opportunity* to make *trial of*) I say, by the *help* of such *credible Compilers*, I shall give in a *cloud of witnesses* (I hope) sufficiently *Authentick*. I do as little love to be *Voluminous* as *Callimachus* would have me, (*cui* μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακὸν) and therefore shall set down only the *substance* of what the Fathers have said, referring the *Reader*, by my *Citations*, *to the larger fields* of their *Discourses*.

Ignatius in ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. edit. Usser.

Ἐὰν ἀσεβῇ τις, ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Διαβόλου οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης γινόμενος.

Justin. Martyr. in Apolog. prima pro Christianis pag. 35. edit. Sylburg. 1593.

Ὅτι αὐτεξούσιον τότε τῶν Ἀγγέλων γένος καὶ τῶν Ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς, δικαίως ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πλημμελήσωσι, τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν αἰωνίῳ πυρὶ κομίσονται.

Pluribus pereuntibus, quomodo defenditur perfecta bonitas? *ex majore parte cessatrix, paucis aliqua, pluribus nulla, cedens perditioni*, partiaria exitii? *Quòd si plures salvi non erunt, erit jam non bonitas, sed malitia perfectior. —magis autem non faciens salvos, dum paucos facit*, perfectior erit in non juvando. *—suæ potestatis invenio hominem à Deo constitutum, —lapsúmq; hominis non Deo, sed libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum.* (I wonder *Vossius* did not remember *Tertullian*, then whom there is not any one more directly for this purpose. *Justin Martyr* also was ill omitted; and so was S. *Ignatius*.)

Tertull. contra Marcion. l. 1. c. 24 edit. Jun. A.D. 1597.

Lib. 2. cap. 5. 6.

Clemens Alex. ἐν προτρεπτ. p. 24. edit. Comnel. vide & Clem. Rom. l. 1. Διαταγῶν, cap. 45.

Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἐκ δούλων υἱοὺς ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι βούλεται· οἱ δὲ υἱοὶ γενέσθαι ἐπηρεφανήκασιν. —ὦ τῆς ἀπονοίας πολλῆς. Τὸν κύριον ἀπαιχύνεσθε, ἐλευθερίαν ἐπαγγέλλεται, ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰς δουλείαν ἀποδιδράσκετε.

Ἀεὶ

Theophil. ad Autol. l. 3 p. 336. edit. Basil. 1555.

Ἀεὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ βουλομένου ἐπιστρέφειν τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν.

Origen. tract. 34. in Matth. p. 194.

Ignem autem æternum non illis, *quibus dicitur* [*discedite à me maledicti*] *paratum ostendit, sicut regnum justis, sed* Diabolo, *& Angelis ejus: quia quantum ad se, homines non ad perditionem creavit, sed ad vitam æternam & gaudium.* (Note that *Chrysostome, Theophylact*, and *Euthymius*, interpret those words of *Christ*, as *Origen* doth.)

Athanas. orat. de incarn. verbi Dei. T. 1. p. 45.

Τί δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἐποίει τούτους, ἀφ' ὧν οὐκ ἠθέλησε γινώσκεσθαι;

Macarius Homil. 26. p. 230.

Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς, ἵνα δείξῃ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπλάγχνα, πάντας δέχεται, πᾶσαν προαίρεσιν. Et alibi, αὐτὸς πολὺ σπλαγχνίζεται ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, μακροθυμῶν, πότε ἐπιστρέψαντες προσέλθωμεν πρὸς αὐτόν.

Homil. 30. p. 53.

Basil. Homil. in Psal. 29. p. 80.

Τιμωρία, κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον κρῖμα τοῦ Θεοῦ· ζωὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ. Τί οὖν φησίν; ὅτι ὃ μὲν θέλει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦτό ἐστι, πάντας μετέχειν αὐτοῦ τῆς ζωῆς.

Ambros. l. 2. de secundâ Interpellat. David. c. 11.

Ideo venit Dominus Jesus ut salvum faceret quod perierat. Venit ergo ut peccatum mundi tolleret, ut vulnera nostra curaret. Sed quia non omnes medicinam expetunt, sed pleriq; Refugiunt, —ideo volentes curat, non adstringit invitos.

Hilarius Diacon. in epist. Pauli in Rom. c. 3. & 9 Idem ad 1 Tim 11.

Non injustè judicat, quia omnes vult salvos fieri, manente justitia. —Deus utiq; vult omnes salvos fieri. Cur non impletur ejus voluntas? Sed in omni locutione, sensus est, conditio latet. *Vult* omnes *salvos fieri, sed* si accedant *ad eum: non enim sic vult, ut nolentes salventur, sed vult illos salvari, si & ipsi velint: nam legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit à salute.*

* Chrysost. in 1 Tim c. 2. p. 1556. Idem ad Ephes. c. 1. Hom. 1. p. 1036.

* Μιμοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰ πάντας θέλει σωθῆναι, εἰκότως ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δεῖ εὔχεσθαι. Εἰ πάντας αὐτὸς ἠθέλησε σωθῆναι, θέλε καὶ σύ. Εἰ δὲ θέλεις, εὔχου. —πανταχοῦ μὲν εὐδοκία, τὸ θέλημά ἐστι τὸ προηγούμενον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἄλλο θέλημα. οἷον θέλημα πρῶτον, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ἡμαρτηκότας· θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γενομένους κακοὺς ἀπολέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοὺς κολάζει, ἀλλὰ θέλημα. —εὐδοκία οὖν τὸ πρῶτον θέλημα. Τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα, τὸ μετ' ἐπιθυμίας θέλημα. —τίνος ἕνεκεν οὕτω φιλεῖ; ἀπὸ μόνης ἀγαθότητος. Ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἀγαθότης ἐστί.

Mi-

Miseratur humano generi Deus, & non vult perire quod fecit. *Hieronymus advers. Pelagianos l. 2. sub finem. & ad Eph. c. 1.*

Vult Deus quæcunq; sunt plena rationis & consilii. Vult salvari omnes & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed quia nullus absq; propriâ voluntate servatur, (liberi enim arbitrii sumus) vult nos bonum velle, ut cum voluerimus, velit in nobis & ipse suum implere consilium.

Constat Deum omnia bona velle, sed homines suo vitio præcipitantur in malum. *Primasius in 1 Tim. 2.*

Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς προηγουμένως θέλει πάντας σωθῆναι, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ κολάσαι ἔπλασεν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μεταχεῖν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀγαθός. Ἁμαρτάνοντας δὲ θέλει κολάζεσθαι ὡς δίκαιος. Λέγεται οὖν τὸ πρῶτον προηγούμενον θέλημα, καὶ εὐδοκία ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄν. Τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἑπόμενον θέλημα, καὶ παραχώρησις ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας. —ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· εἰ γὰρ θέλων κείνει, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ προηγούμενον θέλημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἑπόμενον. —καὶ τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἀγαθότητός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἑπόμενον, τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ. *Damascenus l. 2. orth. fid. c. 29.* *Idem contra Manichæos p. 375 edit. Basil. 1578.*

Εἰ θέλει ὁ Θεὸς [πάντας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν] τί μὴ γίνεται ὃ θέλει; οὐ γίνεται, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οὐ θέλουσιν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην ποιεῖ ὁ Θεός. *Oecumenius ad 1 Tim. 2.*

Duæ sunt voluntates in Deo. Una misericordiæ, *quæ non est cogens, nec aliquid libero arbitrio aufert. Quâ omnes homines vult salvos fieri, quod tamen in liberâ voluntate illorum positum est. Est alia, quæ est de effectibus rerum, de quâ dicitur, [omnia quæcunq; voluit, fecit.] huic nemo potest resistere. De quâ dicitur, Voluntati ejus quis resistit? (atq; hæc est duplex,* permittens, *respectu mali;* approbans, *respectu boni.) Itaq; homines resistunt* voluntati misericordiæ, *& non resistunt* voluntati justitiæ. *(Postea in hunc sensum.) Orat ergo,* fiat voluntas tua, *sicut in cœlo (ubi non resistitur) sic & in terris, ubi resistitur.* *Anselmus in Matth. c. 6.*

Deus ex se sumit seminarium miserendi. Quod judicat & condemnat nos, eum quodammodo cogimus, *ut longè aliter de corde ipsius miseratio, quàm animadversio procedere videatur. —omnibus offertur, & in communi posita est Dei misericordia; nemo illius expers est, nisi qui renuit.* *Bernardus serm. 5. in Natal. Dom.* *Idem serm. 1. in purif. Mar.*

If after all these testimonies, I have S. *Austin* and *Prosper* to side with me in my assertion, I know not why I may not seem,

to those who think me in an error, at least to have *rationally* and *discreetly erred*: and though *Grotius* gives a reason why S. *Austin* is the unfittest to be a *Judge* in these matters, yet if *Prosper* (who best knew him) may be allowed for his *Interpreter*, I am very well content that he be one of my *Jury*; for of *four Expositions* which that Father made (in several parts of his writings) upon 1 *Tim.* 2.4 [*God will have all men to be saved,*] I finde *one* very directly just such as I would have it; and it is even in those writings which he pen'd after the Heresie of *Pelagius* was on foot; which is therefore with me of very great *moment* and *Authority*.

Grotius in Rivet. Apolog. Discus. p. 97, 98.

To this Question,

De bonâ voluntate unde sit, si naturâ, cur non omnibus, cùm sit idem Deus omnium Creator? si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cùm omnes homines velit salvos fieri?

Augustin. lib. de Spiritu & litterâ ad Marcellinum c. 33.

He thus Answers,

Vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, *quo vel bene vel malè utentes* justissimè judicentur. *Quod quum sit, Infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cùm ejus Evangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verùm seipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malisq; pœnalibus implicant, experturi in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt.*

Idem serm. 38. de Sanctis.

Inevitabilis illa sententia, [discedite à me maledicti] *à piissimo Deo ideo multo antè prædicitur, ut à nobis totis viribus cæveatur: si enim nos Deus noster vellet punire, non nos ante tot secula commoneret. Invitus quodam modo vindicat, qui quomodo evadere possimus, multo antè demonstrat: non enim te vult percutere, qui tibi clamat,* observa.

'Tis very true that S. *Austin* did sometimes let fall such expressions, (transported sometimes in the heat of his dispute) as rais'd some calumnies after his death, as if he had thought that *God created the greatest part of mankinde on purpose to do the will, not of God, but of the Devil.* But *Prosper* made it appear, in his Answers to *that* and the like Objections, that they who censur'd *Austin's Judgement*, were seduced to it by his *style*: and that (notwithstanding the misfortune of his expressions) *Austin's* judgement and his *owne*, was clearly this (and so * *Fulgentius* doth professe to understand it.) —*Syn-*

* *Nihil aliud accipiendum in isto Augustini sermone existimo, quo ad interitum quosdam prædestinatos firmat. &c.* Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1.

---*Syncerissimè credendum atq; profitendum est, Deum velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant. Siquidem Apostolus, cujus ista sententia est, sollicitissimè præcipit, ut Deo pro omnibus hominibus supplicetur: ex quibus* quòd multi pereunt, pereuntium est meritum; *quòd multi salvantur, salvantis est donum.* —Nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret: *quia* alia est causa Nascendi, alia Pereundi. *Ut enim nascantur homines, conditoris est beneficium; ut autem pereant, prævaricatoris est meritum.* ----*Insanum omnino est dicere,* Voluntatem Dei ex Dei voluntate non fieri; *& Damnatorem Diaboli ejúsq; famulorum, velle ut Diabolo serviatur.* ---*Nullo modo credendum homines---ex Dei voluntate cecidisse, cùm potius allevet Dominus omnes qui corruunt, & erigat omnes elisos.* ---*Dei ergo voluntas est, ut in bonâ voluntate maneatur.* Qui & priusquam deseratur, neminem deserit. *Et multos* desertores sæpe convertit. ---*Deus nec quæ illuminavit, obcæcat; nec quæ ædificavit, destruit; nec quæ plantavit, evellit.* Quia præsciti sunt casuri, non sunt prædestinati. *Essent* autem prædestinati, si essent reversuri, & in sanctitate ac veritate mansuri: *ac per hoc prædestinatio Dei multis* est Causa standi, nemini est Causa labendi. ----*Hi* cùm à pietate deficiunt, non ex Dei opere, sed ex sua voluntate deficiunt. Casuri *tamen &* recessuri *ab eo, qui falli non potest,* præsciuntur. —*Deniq;* qui voluntatem spreverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.

Prosper (seu August.) ad object. Vicen. Artic. 2. & seqq.

Ὁ Διάβολος τὸν πρῶτον ἀπατήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, θνητὸν τὸ γένος διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου παραβάσεως ἀπειργάσατο. Theodor. Heracl. in Joh. 8. 44.

Anathema illi qui per Dei præscientiam in mortem hominem deprimi dixerit. Synod. Arelatensis.

Suo prorsus decipiuntur Arbitrio, suâ voluntate labuntur, & si in hac desidiâ perseverent, ipsi se his quæ accepere, despoliant. Scriptor de vocat. Gent. l. 2. cap. 11.

Quos præscivit Deus homines vitam in peccato terminaturos, prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos. Fulgentius ad Monimum. l. 1.

* *Causâ Reprobationis certum est hanc esse, viz. peccatum in hominibus.* Melancthon in locis Theolog. de prædest.

* Lastly, that this is precisely the Judgement of the *Church of England*, I cannot better prove then by that *sense* and *apprehension* which *Bishop Overal* had of it; who does professedly interpret the *minde* of her *Articles* in this particular, and was

Idem ubiq; ait Petrus Molinæus in sua anatome Arminianismi.

was as well able to do it as any man that ever lived.

D. Overallus Theol. Cantab. professor de sanctâ Eccles. Anglic. &c. cap. 1.

---*Sub* generali *promissione & præcepto tutò quisq; potest in-dubiâ fide se includere: & cum certâ spe ac fiduciâ ad threnum gratiæ accedere, veréq; cognoscere, si non* confidat *Deo* promittenti, & mandanti obsequatur, suam culpam esse, *non Dei: idq; per* negligentiam suam, non gratiæ divinæ defectum accidere. ----*Ordo divinæ prædestinationis nostræ in Articulo septimo iste videtur intentus; Deum præscium lapsûs generis humani ad remedium ejusdem filium mittendum decrevisse, in eóq;* salutis conditionem *statuisse; tum ad eam in animis hominum producendam* necessaria & sufficientia *media & auxilia* omnibus generatim *secundum* magis & minus *ordinâsse, quæ* magis speciatim *his quos in Christo elegit ex reliquo hominum genere pro suo beneplacito cumularet, quibus hi ad fidem, perseverantiam & æternam salutem certissimè perducantur, &* reliqui nihil habeant quod conquerantur, &c.

Cap. 2 de morte Christi.

De morte Christi tam plena & ubiq; sibi constans Ecclesiæ nostræ sententia, pro omnibus omnino hominibus, *sive pro* omnibus omnium hominum peccatis, *Jesum Christum mortuum esse, ut* mirandum sit ullos ex nostris id in controversiam vocare.

Artic. 2.

Pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis, non tantùm pro culpâ Originis.

Artic. 7.

Æterna vita humano generi est proposita.

Artic. 31.

Oblatio Christi semel facta perfecta est Redemptio, propitiatio & satisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi tam originalibus quàm actualibus.

Calvin. ad Heb. 9. 28.

It is farther observed by that most moderate and learned man, that Mr. *Calvin himself*, however *rigid* he was in *some* places, did yet so *soberly* contradict himself in *others*, that those very texts of Scripture in which it is affirmed [*Christ dyed for many*] he so interprets as to say, the word [*many*] is put to signifie [*all*] as *Heb.* 9. 28. and that many are not saved is (saith he) for this reason, [*quia eos impedit sua incredulitas*] *because they are hindred by their own incredulity.*

Idem ad Rom. 5.

19. I have not translated these Authorities, because they are principally meant for such as are able to understand them. And if any *plain Reader* shall desire to have them in the *Grosse* without being troubled to suffer them over in the *Retail*, he may

The Total sum of the Citations.

be

be pleas'd to receive it in these following words: *That God did not absolutely, irrespectively, unconditionally decree the everlasting misery of any one, but in a foresight and intuition of their refusing his proffer. That he sent his son to dye for all the sins of the whole world, inviting and commanding all men every where to repent* [and be forgiven] (Act. 17. 30.) *but that most, like the* slave *in* Exodus, *are in love with their bondage; and will be bored through the ear. That everlasting fire was prepared especially, (not for men, but) for the Devil and his Angels; nor for them by a peremptory irrespective Decree, but in præscience and respect of their pride and Apostasie. That Christ came to save that which was lost, and to call sinners to Repentance, and to have gather'd them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but they would not. That God gave his law, his rule, his promises to all, and excepted none in the publishing of either; but so as he expected they should be willing as well as he; for he would not save any whether they would or no. That God Almighty made no man on purpose to torment him, but that he might participate of his goodnesse. "That so many as perish may thank themselves; and that so many "as live forever, are beholding to nothing but the grace of God. That "God Decreed the fall of none, but the raising up of those were down: "and that those very men who are reprobated had been predestin'd "to salvation, if they would have return'd and remain'd in truth and "holinesse. Gods Decrees being to* many *the cause of their rise, but "to none of their downfal. Lastly, that they who have despis'd the "will of God which did invite them to repentance, shall feel the terrors of his will, which is to execute vengeance upon the children of Disobedience.*

The *English Reader* may be pleas'd to observe, that these last words are translated out of *Prosper* in his vindication of *Augustine* his dearest *friend*, who is the only Father (I can hear of) whom our *Adversaries* are willing to be *tryed* by in this businesse. (See the Confession of Dr. *Twiss. in Vind. c. Grat. l.* 1. *Dign.* 8. § 4. *p.* 110.)

20. From all this together which hath been said from *Scripture*, from *Reason*, from the *Authority* of the *Ancients* (who are the fittest of any to *interpret* Scripture) I thus conclude within my self. That *God Almighty* is the *Author* of *men* and *Angels*; That *wicked Angels* and *wicked men* are the *Authors* of *sin*; and that the *sin* of *men* and *Angels* is the *Author* of unexpressible and *endlesse punishment*. That *sin* is *Rebellion* against the *Majesty* of God; That *hell* was made to punish *Rebels*; and that God

The Result of all.

Ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐδ' ἂν ἀσεβεῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ἐποίουν. *Plotin. Enn. l.* 2. *p.* 263.

Αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμονες καὶ τάλανες ταῖς ἑαυτῶν αἱρέσεσι γίνονται. *Hierocl. εἰς τὰ χρυσ. ἔπ. p.* 258.

God never *decreed* any *Rebellion againſt himſelf.* Upon which it followes, that as I look for the *Cauſe* of my *election* in the *ſole merits* of my *Redeemer*, ſo for the *cauſe* of my *Reprobation*, in the *obliquity* of my *will*: becauſe the *Reaſon* of my *puniſhment* is to be taken from my *ſin*; and the *Reaſon* of my *ſin* is to be taken from my *ſelf*: from whence there followes (and follow it *will*, do what I *can*) A *ſecond Inference* from my *firſt*, *Compared with my firſt Principle*, viz.

Chap. III.

21. *The ſecond Inference, Explain'd.*

That *every Reprobate* is *predetermin'd* to *eternal puniſhment*, not by Gods *irreſpective*, but *conditional Decree.* God doth puniſh no man under the notion of a *Creature*, but under the notion of a *Malefactor*: and becauſe he does not *create* a *malefactor*, but a *man*, he hateth nothing that he hath *created*, but in as much as it hath *wilfully* (as it were) *uncreated* his *image* in it. So that no man is *ſinfull*, becauſe *ordain'd* to *condemnation*; but *ordain'd* to *condemnation*, becauſe he is *ſinful.* Sin is *foreſeen*, and *puniſhment* is *foreappointed*; but becauſe that *ſin* is the *cauſe* of *puniſhment*, and that the *cauſe* is not *after*, but *before* the *effect* (in priority of *nature*, though not of *time*) it followes that the *effect* is not *foreappointed*, until the *Cauſe* is *foreſeen.* So that God *damns* no man by an *abſolute decree*, (that is to ſay) *without reſpect* or *intuition* of *ſin*; but the *præſcience* of the *Guilt*, is the *motive* and *inducement* to the *determining* of the *Judgement.* And yet however my *ſecond Inference* is depending upon my *firſt* by an *eſſential tye*, (which gives it the *force* and *intrinſick form of Demonſtration*) yet becauſe ſome *Readers* will aſſent much ſooner, to a *plain Reaſon* leſſe convincing, then to a more *convincing Reaſon* leſſe plain, (and that ſome are wrought upon, by an argument exactly *proportion'd* to their *Capacities* or *Tempers*, rightly *level'd* and *adapted* more by *luckineſſe* then *deſign*, whileſt another argument is *diſpleaſing* they know not why, but that there is an *odneſſe* in the *look* and *meen*, which betokens ſomething of *ſubtilty*, and

and makes them ſuſpect there is a *ſerpent*, though they ſee not the *Ambuſh* in which it *lurks*) I will gratifie *ſuch a Reader* by a proof of *this* too; firſt from *Scripture*, then from *Reaſon* (grounded upon Scripture) and laſt of all by an addition to my former ſuffrages of *Antiquity*: in which S. *Auſtin* more eſpecially ſhall ſpeak *as plainly*, and as *ſtrongly* in my behalf, as any man that can be *brib'd* to be an *Advocate*, or a *witneſſe*.

22. That my proof from *Scripture* may be the more effectual, I ſhall firſt deſire it may be conſider'd; that ſince God is affirmed to have a *ſecret* and a *revealed will*, we muſt not præpoſterouſly interpret what we *read* of his *revealed will* by what we *conjecture* of his *ſecret* one: (for that were to go into the *dark* to judge of thoſe *Colours* which are ſeen only by the *light*) but we muſt either not *conjecture* at that which cannot be *known* (as Gods *ſecret* will cannot be, but by ceaſing to be *ſecret*) or if we needs will be ſo *buſie*, we muſt *gueſſe* at his *ſecret* will by what we *know* of his *revealed* one, that ſo at leaſt we *modeſtly* and *ſafely* erre. Upon which it followes: that we who meekly confeſſe we have not been of Gods *Councell*, muſt only judge of his *eternal and imperveſtigable Decrees* by what we finde in his *Word* concerning his *Promiſes* and his *Threats*: which are fitly called the *Tranſcripts or Copies of his Decrees*. Such therefore as are his *Threats*, ſuch muſt needs be his *Decrees*, (becauſe the one cannot *prævaricate* or *evacuate* the other) but his *Threats* (as well as *Promiſes*) are all *conditional*, therefore his *decrees* muſt be ſo too. Thus in his *Covenant* with *Adam* (and indeed the *word Covenant* doth evince what I am ſpeaking) he *threatens* Death, or *decrees* it, (not with that peremptory Reaſon, which is the *redoubling* of the *will* only, *I will therefore becauſe I will*, but) on ſuppoſition of his *eating* the *forbidden* fruit. Which was not *therefore forbidden*, that *Adam* might *ſin* in the *eating*, (*man* was not ſo *enſnared* by the *guide of his youth*) but *Adam ſin'd* in the *eating*, becauſe it had been *forbidden*. Such immediately after was Gods language to *Cain*. | *If thou* do well, thou ſhalt be accepted, and *if thou* doeſt not well, ſin lyeth at the door. | Again (ſaith *God* by the *mouth* of *Moſes*) Behold, I ſet before you this Day a *Bleſſing* and a *Curſe*. *A Bleſſing, if ye obey*; and *a Curſe, if ye will*

Proved by Scripture.

Gen. 2 17.

Chap. 4. v. 7.

Deut 11. 26, 27.

will not obey. That is the form of making *Covenants* betwixt *God* and *man* every where throughout the Scripture: and according to the *fulfilling* or *not fulfilling* of the *Condition*, the *Righteous Judge* of all the *world* proceeds to *ſentence*. Which that we may not ſo much as *doubt* of, He (by a merciful *Anthropopathia*) is pleaſed to ſpeak *like one of us. I will go down now and ſee, whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, and if not, I will know.* There is an expreſſion of God to *Eli* (1 *Sam.* 2. 30.) which ſhewes his will ſometimes is either *not abſolute*, or *not immutable. I ſaid indeed that the Houſe of thy Father ſhould walk before me forever. But now the Lord ſaith, Be it far from me.* Which words do not argue any *fickleneſſe* in his *Will*, but demonſtrate his *Promiſe* to have been *conditionall*: there was an [*If*] *impli'd*, though not *expreſſed*, and ſo it appears by the very next words. This is alſo the ſtyle that is uſed in the *New Teſtament. If thou ſhalt confeſſe with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus, and ſhalt beleeve in thine heart, &c. thou ſhalt be ſaved.* From whence it followes, that *if* thou ſhalt *not* confeſſe with thy mouth, *nor* beleeve in thine heart, &c. *thou ſhalt be damn'd. If we forgive not men their treſpaſſes, neither will your Father forgive your treſpaſſes.* If *we ſuffer, we ſhall alſo reign; if we deny him, he alſo will deny us.* I will caſt her into a bed, and them that commit fornication with her, into great tribulation, *except they repent* (Rev. 2. 22.) *If ye beleeve not that I am he,* ye ſhal dye *in your ſins*, Joh. 8. 24. In a word, the very end of Chriſts coming into the world, was to *ſave us from our ſins*, (Mat. 1. 12.) *to redeem us from all iniquity.* (Tit. 2. 14.) He came to deliver us indeed out of the hand of our enemies, *but to the end that we might ſerve him in holineſſe and righteouſneſſe all the daies of our lives.* (Luk. 1. 44. 45.) Now the *end* (we know) is the *prime condition*, the *greateſt requiſite* of all: which to neglect without repentance, is the *true Cauſe* of *condemnation*: for ſo runs the *ſentence* of our Saviour (Mat. 25. 41.) *Depart from me ye curſed into everlaſting fire.* Why? for what *Reaſon*? He gives the *true reaſon* in the next verſe, (not becauſe ye were *Reprobated* by an *abſolute Decree*; not becauſe ye were *ordain'd* to be *veſſels of wrath* by a meer *irreſpective* and *inexorable will*, but) *becauſe I was hungry and ye gave me no meat, becauſe*

Gen. 18. 21.

Rom. 10. 9.

Mat. 6. 15.

2 Tim. 2. 12.

Mat. 1. 12. Tit. 2. 14.

Luk. 1. 44, 44.

Mat 25. 41, 42.

becauſe I was thirſty and ye gave me no drink. (Which yet they could not have given him, if it had not been *given* them from above to *give.*) From which and a thouſand ſuch Texts beſides, I do thus ſtate the matter betwixt me and my ſelf. That no man is *infinitely puniſht* by an *unavoidable neceſſity*, but for *not doing his Duty*; nor becauſe he *cannot*, but *will not do it*. *Impoſſibility* is not a *ſin*, and therefore no man is *puniſht* for *not doing that*, which it is *impoſſible* for him *to do*. It was the cruelty of *Adonibezek*, to cut off mens Thumbs, and then to make it *their task* to *gather up meat under the Table*. A greater cruelty in *Pharaoh* to require *a Tale of brick*, where he gave *no ſtraw*. Whereas the *maſter* we *ſerve*, will *render to every man according to his works*. *With him there is no reſpect of perſons*. *But whatſoever a man ſoweth, that ſhall he reap*. And therefore let us not *ſin*, under pretence that all we do is by an *abſolute Decree*: (an *opinion* brought, amongſt *other Merchandiſe*, out of *Turkie* into *Chriſtendome*, and would be rooted out in the next *Reformation*) for every ſuch ſinner is his own *worſt Satan*, *he ſeeks out death in the errour of his way, and puls upon himſelf Deſtruction with the works of his hands.*

Judg. 1. 7.

Rom. 2. 6. 11.

Gal. 6. 7.

Wiſd. 1. 12.

Other proofs out of Scripture, (and perhaps, to ſome, more convincing) will be found interweaved in my following proofs.

23. I muſt next confirm this truth by *Reaſon*; and becauſe this *Reaſon* will be *manifold*, I will make it my endeavour to be brief in *each*. Whereof the *firſt* ſhall be taken from the *nature of puniſhment*, which (as before I ſignified) does præſuppoſe a *ſin*; ſin does imply a *breach of Law*; and this again does imply at once, *a rational and a voluntary agent*. Which ſeems to me to be the Reaſon, why God is not offended with the *Cruelty of the Bear*, or with the *Pride* of the *Peacock*, or with the *Theevery* of the *Fox*. This is the reaſon, why the *Earth* does not *ſin* by breeding *Thornes and Thiſtles* againſt its *primitive Inſtitution*. For the *ground* cannot be *puniſht*, and was not *curſed* for its *own*, but for *Adam's* ſake. (Gen. 3. 17. 18.) And laſtly, this is the Reaſon, why the *Tower* of *Siloe* was not *Damn'd* for committing *murder*. *Man* is an *Agent* very

Proved ſecondly by Reaſon.

Gen. 3. 17, 18.

capable of a *Law*, and ſo of *ſin*, and ſo of *puniſhment*; and is *therefore* puniſht, not becauſe he *could not*, but becauſe he *could* help it, by that *goodneſſe of God* which would have *led him* Rom. 2. 4, 5. *to Repentance*, if he had not *deſpis'd the riches of his goodneſſe*. Man is puniſht becauſe he *would* ſin, and not becauſe he *could not but ſin*.

24. My *ſecond Reaſon* is taken from the *nature* of a *Covenant*; which ever implies *a Condition*: now when the *firſt Covenant* was broken, God *immediately* made a *ſecond*; not with *a part*, but with *all mankinde*. And this is obſervable in the *Title* of our *Goſpel*; [ἡ καινὴ Διαθήκη] which though we render the [*New Teſtament*] we might better render the [*New Covenant*,] which cannot be without *Conditions*. *Heaven* and *Hell* are ſet before us; the performance of *Faith* and *Obedience*, is that important *condition*; without which, as the former will not be had, ſo cannot the latter be avoided.

25. My *third Reaſon* is taken from the *unlimited Generality* whereby *Promiſes and Threats, Rewards and Puniſhments, Exhortations and Dehortations*, are exhibited to *all*. The *Goſpel* is com- Mat. 28. 19. manded to be *preached* to *all*; and it is publiſhed in *writing*, Luk. 24. 47. that all might read and beleeve; *Baptiſme*, *Repentance*, and *Re-* Joh. 20. 31. *miſſion* of ſins are commanded to be *offered* to *all in general*, Luk. 9. 5. even to them that *refuſe* both the *Word and the Preachers*. Who *when* they are refus'd (and not before) are *to ſhake the Duſt off their feet for a Teſtimony againſt them*. Now *preachings* would be *vain*, and *exhortations* would be *deceitful*, if *life* and *death* did not *depend* upon *ſubmitting* or *refuſing* to be amended by them.

26. My *fourth Reaſon* is taken from the *Degrees of Damnation*. Luk. 12. 47. Some ſhall be beaten with *many ſtripes*, and ſome with *fewer*; Cap. 20. v. 47. ſome ſhall have a *leſſe*, and ſome a *greater Condemnation*. It ſhall Mat. 11. 20, be worſe for *Chorazin* then for *Tyre*, worſe for *Bethſaida* 21, 23, 24. then for *Sidon*, worſe for *Capernaum* then for *Sodom*, worſe Mat. 10. 15. for the *Jewes* then for the *Ninevites*; which is not becauſe one had a greater *Neceſſity* of ſinning then the other, but one was guilty of the greater *Contempt*. Not becauſe God had *abſolutely Decreed a greater Puniſhment* to the one, but becauſe the one had *means* of *ſinning leſſe* then the other. For our Saviour

ſayes

ſayes expreſly, that if the *mighty works* which were done in *Tyre* and *Sidon* had been alſo done in *Chorazin* and *Bethſaida*, they would have *repented in Sackcloth and Aſhes*. Which was as much as to tell them, that it was not at all for want of *means and mercy* on Gods part, but for want of *will* on *theirs*, that they did not *do* what was *commanded* to be *done*. And therefore our Saviour *did upbraid them, becauſe they repented not*, (Mat. 11. 20.) which he could not have done, had it been *impoſſible* for them to have repented. Our bleſſed Saviour was *too pitiful*, and of too *ſweet* a *diſpoſition*, to *jeer* a *poor Creature* for being *ſuch* as God *made* him, or for being ſuch as he *could not but be*, whether by *fatal*, or by *natural infirmity*. We eſteem it an *ill nature* to upbraid a *ſtammerer* for *not ſpeaking plain*; nor is any man *reproached* for being *naturally*, but *wilfully blinde*; nor for being *born deaf*, but for being like *the Adder that ſtoppeth her ears*. He that *bindes* my *feet*, and then *invites* me to *come* to him, *intends* me nothing for *entertainment* but a *ſalted Sarcaſme*, or *bitter Jeſt*; for if he were *ſerious*, he would ſet my *feet* at *liberty*, that I might come in *good earneſt*; and not ſay to me, as we ſay to a Childe that is *fallen down*, [*Come hither to me and I will lift thee up.*] And yet this Mr. *Calvin* is fain to ſay, (having been firſt of all ingaged in that opinion) *That ſo many nations of men together with their infants were involved without remedy in eternal puniſhment, by the fall of Adam, for no imaginable reaſon, but that ſo it ſeemed good in the ſight of God*: and being pincht with that Text (Ezek. 18. 23.) *Have I any pleaſure at all that the wicked ſhould die, and not that he ſhould return from his waies and live?* he is fain to ſay, *That God wils not the Death of a ſinner ſo far forth as he wils his Repentance. Which experience teacheth us he doth ſo will, as not to touch his heart that he may repent.* Which is all one as to ſay, He *wils it ſo*, as to *command it*; but he does *not will it ſo*, as to *leave it poſſible*: (that is) he wils it in *ſhew*, but not in *reality*. Nor do I know any way poſſible for Mr. *Calvin* to *eſcape* thoſe *ugly ſequels*, but by ſaying [that the *ſinner* may *repent* by the *ſtrength* and *force* of *Nature*, without the *touch* of his heart by the *grace of God*,] which is to *ſhelter* himſelf under the *Hereſie* of *Pelagius*. *Solomon* gives us a more *rationall*

Joh. 3 19. Pſal. 58. 4.

Calvinus in Inſtitut. l. 3. cap. 23. § 7.

Mortem non vult Deus, in quantum vult pœnitentiam. Sed experientia docet, ita eam velle, ut cor peccatoris non tangat. Idem in Ezek. 18.

nall accompt, why *Wisdome* one day will *laugh* at mens *calami-*
Prov. 1. 26. *ties*, and *mock* when their *fear cometh*; even becauſe they *hated*
29. *knowledge* and did *not chooſe the fear of the Lord.*

27. My *fifth Reaſon* is taken from the *nature* of *Death*, as that does ſignifie *Privation*, and as *Privation* ſuppoſes a former *Habit*. A ſtone is ſaid to be *not alive*, becauſe it ſuffers the *Negation of life*; but a ſtone cannot properly be ſaid to be *dead*, becauſe it doth not ſuffer the *Privation* of *life*. So that when a man is ſaid in Scripture to be ſpiritually *dead* in Treſpaſſes and Sins, he is imply'd by that expreſſion to have been ſpiritually *alive*. And no man is damn'd for the *Negation*, but the *Privation of Grace*; becauſe the *Negation of Grace* would *be Gods work*, whereas the *Privation* of it is his *own*. It having formerly been ſhew'd, That God doth not puniſh his *own work* in man, but man is puniſht for his *own work*; not for *Gods illiberality*, but for *his own* being *a prodigal*; not becauſe *no Talent* was *given* him, but becauſe he *ſquander'd it away*. Sin is properly the *Death* of *Grace*; *Death* is a *privation*, a *privation* is of a *habit*. So that every ſinner *had grace*, for this very Reaſon that he *hath loſt* it; he *was alive*, for this very Reaſon that he is *dead*. He came *alive* out of *Gods hands*, but he fals deſperately by his *own*. A man may be *dead born*, but he cannot poſſibly be *dead begotten*; *deprived of life* he cannot be in the very Act of his *conception*. A man can no more be *created a ſinner*, then he can be *generated* a *dead man*: which infers the *Condition* of Gods *Decree*.

28. My *ſixth Reaſon* is taken from Chriſts having *bought* thoſe very men (2 Pet. 2.1.) *whoſe damnation did not ſlumber.* (verſ. 3.) I have proved already, *Chriſt died for all that were dead in Adam*, from (2 Cor. 5. 14.) and from ſeveral other Texts. Which he could not be truly affirm'd to do, if any one had been paſt by, by an *abſolute Preterition*. For that any man doth periſh for whom Chriſt dyed, is from his *own ſin*, and *not* from *Adams*, if to free us *from Adams* it was that *Chriſt died*. Which as it hath been already proved, ſo it may be confirmed from other *Scriptures*: as from 1 Joh. 2.2. where he is called *the pro-*
1 Joh. 2. 2. *pitiation, not for our ſins only, but alſo for the ſins of the whole world.* The Apoſtle *foreſees* and *confutes* the Hereſie of Chriſts dying *only for the Elect*, with a *not only, but alſo. He died for Infidels* and

im-

impenitents, as the whole ſtream of the *Fathers* conclude from thoſe words, *Deſtroy not him with thy meat for whom Chriſt died.* Rom. 14. 15. *And ſhall thy weak brother periſh for whom Chriſt died?* That this 1 Cor. 8. 11. was the Judgement of the *primitive Church*, I can prove by an *Induction*, and though I now *ſpare* my *Reader*, yet I ſhall *trouble* him hereafter if I am *Challeng'd* to it. I ſhall at preſent refer him to the 31 *Article* of *our Church of England.* "[The *oblation of Chriſt* once made is a *perfect Redemption*, "*propitiation*, and *ſatisfaction* for *all the ſins* of the *whole world*, "as well *Original* as *Actual.*] I had almoſt forgot *a ſpecial* Teſtimony of S. *John*, who cals the *Meſſias* [*the true light which* Joh. 1. 9. *lighteth every man that cometh into the world.*] So that if any man is in the *Dark*, it is not for *want of Light*, but becauſe he *will not ſee*, (as S. *Chryſoſtome* infers) which is the very interpretation that S. *John* himſelf gives it (chap. 3. verſ. 9.) *This* (ſayes he) *is the* Cap. 3. v. 19. *Condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkneſſe rather then light, becauſe their Deeds were evil.* Sure that which is the *Reaſon* of their *Condemnation*, was the *Condition* upon *which* they were *determin'd* to be *damn'd*: then which I know not what can be ſaid either *more plainly*, or *more convincingly* of *any ſubject* whatſoever.

29. My *ſeventh Reaſon* is taken from the *conditional Decrees of temporal Death, and other temporal puniſhments*; which are ſo *evidently Conditional*, as I cannot beleeve any Creature will deny it. For the Denuntiations of *Deſtruction* to *Nineveh*, and Jonah 3. 4, 10. of *certain death* to *Hezekiah*, do put this quite out of all *ſcruple*: 2 Kin. 20. 5. for the firſt was *not deſtroyed*, and the ſecond did *not die*, at that *determinate time* when God had threatned they *ſhould*. Of which no reaſon can be given, but that Gods *Purpoſes*, and *Decrees*, and *Threats* were *conditional*, on ſuppoſition of their *Impenitence* he *threatned* to *deſtroy*, and therefore on *ſight* of their *Repentance* he promis'd to preſerve. And from hence it is natural to argue thus. Is God *ſo merciful* to *bodies?* and is he *leſſe merciful* to *ſouls?* Does he decree *temporal Judgements conditionally*, becauſe he is *pitiful?* and will he decree *Eternal ones abſolutely*, meerly *becauſe he will?* Is he ſo *unwilling* to inflict the *firſt death*, and will he ſhew his *power*, his *abſolute power* in the *ſecond?* Did he *ſpare* the *Ninevites* in *this life*, becauſe they

they were *penitents?* and will he *damn* them in the *next*, becauſe they were *Heathens*, by his *peremptory Decree?* Is he milde in *ſmall things*, and *ſevere* in the *greateſt?* Is there no other way to underſtand thoſe Texts in *the 9. to the Romans*, then by making thoſe Texts which ſound *ſeverely*, to claſh againſt thoſe that ſound *compaſſionately?* Is it not a more *ſober* and a more *reaſonable Courſe*, to interpret *hard* and *doubtful* Texts by a far greater number more *clear and eaſie*, then perverſly to interpret a *clear* Text by a *doubtful* one, or an *eaſie* text by one that's *difficult?* which is to *ſhew* the light by the *darkneſſe*. Or if ſome Texts have *two ſenſes*, if ſome Texts are liable to *many more*, muſt we *needs* take them in the *worſt?* and that in *meer contradiction* to the *univerſal Church?* If I had no other Argument againſt an *abſolute Reprobation*, this one were ſufficient to prevail with me, That *that Father of mercies* and *God of all conſolation*, who *ſpareth* when we *deſerve puniſhment*, did not *determine* us to *puniſhment without* any *reſpect* to our
1 Kin. 21.29. *indeſervings*. He that had mercy upon wicked *Ahab* meerly becauſe of his *Attrition*, did not *abſolutely damn* him before he had done either *good* or *evill*, before the *foundations of the World were laid*. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men*, (Lam. 3. 33.) much leſſe doth he *damn* them for his *meer will and pleaſure*. When God doth execute a *temporal puniſhment*, upon ſuch as *already have deſerv'd it*, he comes to it with *reluctation*, (ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ) and there-
*Iſa. 28 21. fore cals it his **ſtrange work*, a work he loves not to be *acquainted with*, a work which he doth ſometimes execute, be-
* Lam. 3. 33. cauſe he is *juſt*; but ſtill * *unwillingly*, becauſe he is *compaſſionate*. And he therefore *ſo* expreſſes it, as we are wont to do a thing we are not *us'd to*, and know not *how to ſet about*,
Hoſ. 11. 8, 9. [*How ſhall I give thee up, Ephraim? how ſhall I deliver thee, Iſrael? how ſhall I make thee as Admah? how ſhall I ſet thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turn'd within me, my Repentings are kindled together. I will not execute the fierceneſſe of mine anger,*
Exod. 32. 14. *for I am God, and not man.*] Now that God doth profeſſe to *afflict unwillingly*, and many times *to repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people*, is a *demonſtrative* argument of his *Conditional decrees* in things *Temporal*, and by a greater force of Reaſon in things *Eternal*.

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30. My *eighth Reaſon* is taken from the *little flock* which belongs to God, and the *numerous herd*, which belongs to *Belial*. Which would not have been, if they had both been meaſur'd out by *a moſt abſolute Decree*. For when it pleas'd the *Divine goodneſſe* to ſuffer death upon the Croſſe for all the ſins of the world, (the *every drop* of whoſe bloud had been *ſufficiently precious* to have *purchaſed the Redemption* of *ten thouſand Adams*, and *ten thouſand worlds* of his *poſterity*) he would not yeeld the *major part* unto his *Rival Rebel*, the *black prince of Darkneſſe*; reſerving to himſelf the far *leſſer portion*; and all this *irreſpectively*, meerly becauſe *he would*. He would not *abſolutely determine* ſuch a general *Harveſt* of *Wheat* and *Tares*, as freely to yeeld the Devil the *greater crop*. He would not ſuffer his *Juſtice* ſo to *triumph* over his *Mercy*, who loves that *his Mercy ſhould rejoyce againſt Judgement*. It was not for want of a new *Inſtance* to ſhew his *Power*, or his *Juſtice*; for they were *both* moſt eminent in the great *Myſterie of Redemption*. Much *greater Inſtances and Arguments* then an *Abſolute Decree*; as I could *evidently* ſhew, if I were but ſure of my *Readers patience*. Jam. 2. 13.

My *ninth Reaſon* is taken from the Reprobation of *Angels*, which was not irreſpective, but in regard to their Apoſtaſie, as is and muſt be confeſſed by all who place the object of Reprobation in *maſſâ corruptâ*. For the overthrowing of which tenent (in all the *Sublapſarians*) Dr. *Twiſſe* himſelf does thus argue. *Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare, niſi ut contumaces, ergo nec homines niſi ut in contumaciâ perſeverantes.* De Præ-deſt. Digreſ. 4. § 4. c. 2.

31. My *tenth Reaſon* is taken from the *Abſurdities* which *have*, and *ſtill muſt* follow, if Gods *eternall decree* of mans *miſery* is not *conditional* but *abſolute*. And thoſe *abſurdities* are diſcernible, by this following *Dilemma*.

Let *Dives* be ſuppos'd to be the man that is Damn'd. It is either becauſe he *ſins*, or *meerly* becauſe *God will have it ſo*. If for the *firſt Reaſon*, [*becauſe he ſins*] then *ſin* is the *Cauſe* of his *Damnation*, and conſequently *before it*. From whence it followes, that *Dives* is not *Damn'd* meerly becauſe God will *have*

it ſo; but that God will *have it ſo*, becauſe he *ſins*. (Which plainly ſhewes the *Conditional Decree*.) But if it be ſaid that it is for the [*ſecond Reaſon, meerly becauſe God will have it ſo*] then that *abſolute Decree* to have it ſo, doth either *neceſſitate* him to *ſin damnably*, or it *does not*. Firſt, if it *does*, then how can *Dives* be guilty of that thing, of which Gods *abſolute Decree* is the *peremptory Cauſe*? Or how can that be *guilt*, which is *neceſſity*? (*Dives* could as little have cheriſht *Lazarus*, as the *Tower of Siloe* could have ſpared the *Galilæans*, if his *will* had been no more *free*, then that *Tower* had a *will*.) And *ſecondly if it does not* neceſſitate him to ſin damnably, then *Dives* who is *Damn'd* might poſſibly have *not been damn'd*. From whence it follows, That *Dives* is not Damn'd *abſolutely*, but in *regard* to his *ſins*. (Which had they not been *his choice*, they had not been *his*, but *his that did chooſe them*. And it is a *Contradiction* to ſay, a man *chooſes* any thing *without a free will*, or by an *abſolute neceſſity*, which is, *whether he will or no*.) Beſides; if God did *abſolutely decree* the *end*, which is *Damnation*, and conſequently the *means*, which is *final impenitence*; theſe Abſurdities would follow. *Firſt*, it would be a *Reprobates duty* to be *damn'd*. And to *endevour* his *ſalvation* would be a *ſin*. Becauſe 'twere ſtriving *againſt the ſtream* of Gods *abſolute Will*. If all men are to *chooſe*, and withall *to execute* the *will of God*, and that it is Gods *will* the *greateſt part* ſhall be *damn'd*; it will then be a duty in the *greateſt part* of men, to *go induſtriouſly to Hell*. And to *do good* will be a *vice*, becauſe it tends *Heaven-wards*, and ſo to the Croſſing of an *abſolute irreverſible Decree*. Which ſince I have conſidered, I have leſſe wondred then I was wont, at the concluſion of *Carpocrates*, that *the very worſt of Actions are out of duty to be performed*. *And that the ſoul ſhall be puniſht with its impriſonment in the body, untill ſhe hath fill'd up the number of her iniquities*; according to that Text *Mat.* 5. 29. Which we call *Iniquities*, but they *Duties*. And ſo indeed they would be, if every thing in the world (the *means* as well as the *end*) were *abſolutely ordain'd*, and by conſequence *effected* by God (bleſſed forever) who can *ordain* nothing but *good*. And ſuch *ſin* and *Hell* muſt be [*exceeding good*] if they could poſſibly be *ordain'd*

by

by as *absolute a decree*, as the Heavens and the earth, the water, and the air, of which God said, *they are very good*. *Secondly*, Gods *Revealed will* being that *all should* repent, and his *Secret will* being that very *few shall*; it followes thence, *That it is his will that his will should not be done*. And that God hath *one will* which is the same with the *Devils*; and that when a *Reprobate* saies in the *Pater noster* [thy will be done] he vehemently *prayes* for his *own Damnation*. Which things, as they were falsly objected in *France* against S. *Austin*, so *Prospers* way to excuse him, was to make *protestations* against any such *Tenent*, as *unconditional Reprobation*. He sayes the very things in his *Masters vindication*, which I have said in my *own*. And cals the *sequels* of that *opinion* which he disowns; *most sottish blasphemies*, and not only *prodigious*, but *Devilish lies*. But he denies not that such ill *consequences* will *follow* upon the bold assertion of *irrespective reprobation*, which he does therefore very *distinctly* and very *earnestly disclaim*. And he doth so much speak the very *minde* of S. *Austin*, that he seems sometimes to speak out of his *mouth* too: it being hard to say, whether the *Answers to the Objections of Vincentius* do truly belong to the *Master* or to the *Scholar*, they being inserted in *both their Works*. And that which is called *Prospers* by *Vossius*, is ascribed to S. *Austin* by *Ludovicus Lucius*. If I have made any unfriendly or *injurious inference*, I will *instantly retract it* upon the least *conviction* that it is so. But truly the Reasons which I have given, have serv'd to confirm me in my adhærence to my *second Inference*. Which I yet farther prove by the the *remaining votes of Antiquity*. For though my *former Citations* are all to this purpose, yet I will not *repeat* them, but adde some others, (perhaps more *fully* and *indisputably*) to the number.

Ineptissimæ blasphemiæ. Prodigiosa mendacia. Diabolicus mendaciorum indiculus. Leguntur apud. Prosp. in Præfat. Respon. ad object. Vinc.

32. * And first I will set down the Confession of Mr. *Calvin*, *That the Schoolmen and Ancients are wont to say*, [*Gods Reprobation of the wicked, is in præscience of their wickednesse*] but he professes to beleeve (with *one* more *modern*) *that God foresaw all future things, by no other means, then because he decreed they should be made, or done.*

* *Proved thirdly by Antiquity.*

Solent veteres &c. & Scholastici in eâ acquiescunt &c. Non aliâ ratione quæ futura sunt, prævideat, nisi quia ita ut fierent decrevit. Calvin. instit.

 Nor

l. 3. c. 23. §. 6.

Nec absurdum videri debet, Deum non modò primi hominis Casum & in eo posterorum suorum praevidisse, sed arbitrio quoq; suo dispensasse. Idem ibid. § 7.

Nor ought it (saith he) *to seem absurd, That God did not only foresee, but by his will appoint the fall of Adam, and in him of his posterity.* The *Ancients*, he confesseth, were quite of *another minde*, but becauſe he addes [*dubitanter*] and would have it thought that S. *Auſtin* was for his turn, I will ſet down ſome of *their* words, and begin with *Auſtins*.

33. *Nemo eligitur nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est, [quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi Constitutionem] non video quomodo sit dictum, nisi de praescientiâ Fidei & operum pietatis, & mox —— Jacobus non electus est ut fieret bonus, sed bonus factus eligi potuit.* Auguſtin. ad Simplicianum l. 1. quæſt. 2.

No man is choſen unleſſe as differing from him that is rejected. Nor know I how it is ſaid [that God hath choſen us before the foundation of the world] unleſſe it be meant of his præſcience of faith and good works. —*Jacob* was not choſen that he might be made good, but having been ſeen to be made good was capable of being choſen.

If S. *Auſtin* was ſo diſtinctly for *Conditional Election* (and in thoſe very works too, which he afterwards writ as very ſufficient to confute *Pelagius*) he was infinitely *rather* for *Conditional Reprobation*. As any man knows that knows any thing of him; and may be ſeen in the ſame book to *Simplician*.

Noluit ergo Esau, & non cucurrit. Sed et si voluisset, & cucurrisset, Dei adjutorio pervenisset, nisi vocatione contempta reprobus fieret. Id. in lib. ad Simpl.

Esau would not, and did not run. For if he had, he had attained by the help of God; unleſſe he would be made a Reprobate by a contempt of his vocation.

Num quid iniquitas est apud Deum? absit. Iniquum enim videtur, ut sine ullis bonorum malorumve operum meritis, unum Deus eligat, odiatq; alterum. Id. in Enchirid. cap. 98.

It ſeems unjuſt that without the merits of good or evil works, God ſhould love one, and hate another.

Non necessitatem percundi habuerunt, quia praedestinati non sunt; sed ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntariâ prevaricatione praescisi sunt. Proſper. ad Galorum cap. 3. edit. Baſil. 1621.

Wicked men had no neceſſity of periſhing from their not being elected; but they were therefore not elected, becauſe they were foreſeen to be wicked through their own wilful prevarication.

God

God foreſaw that they would fall by their own proper will, and for that very reaſon did not ſeparate them by election from the ſons of perdition. *Illos ruituros propriâ ipſorum voluntate præſcivit, & ob hoc à filiis Perditionis nullâ prædeſtinatione diſcrevit.* Id. idem. ad. cap. 7.

God is the creator of all men, but no man was created to the end that he may periſh, *Omnium quidem hominum Deus Creator eſt, ſed nemo ab eo ideo creatus eſt ut pereat.* Idem. ad object. Vinc. 3.

34. I have given the more *Teſtimonies* out of *Proſper*, becauſe he is known to have been the *Scholar* and *vindicator* of S. *Auſtin*. And to produce *their ſuffrages* is to imply all the reſt. They having been the *only Ancients* whom their contentions againſt *Pelagianiſm* made to ſpeak ſometimes to the great diſadvantage of their own opinion: as they do not ſtick to confeſſe themſelves. And we ought in all reaſon to take *that* for their *Judgement*, which we finde delivered by themſelves by way of Apologie and *vindication*. But though I need not, I will adde ſome others.

He therefore brought the means of Recovery to all, that whoſoever periſht might impute it to himſelf who would not be cur'd, when he had a Remedy whereby he might. *Ideo omnibus opera ſanitatis detulit, ut quicunq; perierit, mortis ſuæ cauſas ſibi aſcribat, qui curari noluit, cùm remedium haberet quo poſſet evadere.* Ambroſ. l. 2. de Cain & Abel cap. 13.

Even they that ſhall be wicked have power given them of Converſion and Repentance. *Etiam his qui mali ſint futuri, datur poteſtas converſionis & pœnitentiæ.* Hieron. l. 3. adverſus Pelagianos.

God's love and hatred ariſes from his præſcience of things to come, or from the quality of mens works. *Dilectio & odium Dei vel ex præſcientiâ naſcitur futurorum, vel ex operibus.* Idem, ad Malach. 1.

If the day is equally born for all, how much rather is Jeſus Chriſt? —When every man is call'd to a participation of the gift, what is the reaſon, that what God hath equally diſtributed ſhould by humane interpretation be any way leſſen'd? *Si dies æqualiter naſcitur omnibus, quanto magis Chriſtus? —Cum ſinguli ad donarium vocentur, quid eſt ut quod à Deo æqualiter diſtribuitur, humanâ interpretatione minuatur?* Cyprian. Epiſt. 76.

* *Patet omnibus fons vitæ, neq; ab jure potandi quisquam prohibetur, aut jubetur.* Arnob. Adversus Nat. lib. 2.

* The fountain of life lies open to all. Nor is any man forbid or hindred from the right of Drinking.

Let D. *Twisse* himself be heard to speak in this matter, and that against *Piscator* (both *Antiarminians*) *Damnatio est Actus Judicis, & procedere debet secundum justitiam vindicativam: at ne vestigium quidem Justitiæ apparet in Damnatione Reproborum.* (He speaks of absolute irrespective Reprobation which *Piscator* set up) *Nam justitia neminem damnat nisi merentem. At esse reprobum, nequaquam significat mereri Damnationem. Sola Damnatio peccatoris splendere facit Dei Justitiam.* Twissus in vind. Gr. de Præd. l. 1. Digr. 1. §. 4. p. 57.

35. *Time* and *paper* would fail *me*, and *sufficient Patience* would fail my *Reader*, if I should make repetition of all I finde to my purpose. For whatsoever hath been spoken by the *Fathers*, of *universal Redemption*, doth Diametrically oppose the *irrespective Reprobation*. And to reckon up their *verdicts* in that behalf, were to ingage my *self* and my *Reader* in a new *Ocean* of *employment*. I hope the account that I have given of my *belief* in this matter is a sufficient *Apologie* for my *belief*, and may at least *excuse*, though not *commend* me. Rather then offend any man who takes me *upon Trust* to be *unsound* in my *principles*, I have made this *excuse* for being *orthodox*. And do humbly desire to be *forgiven* if I still adhære to *that Doctrine*, which by *Scripture*, and *Reason*, and the Authority of my *teachers*, I am verily perswaded is the *truest* and the most *safe*: (to wit,)

The sum of all that hath been said.

1. That *man* himself is the *Cause* of his *sin*.
2. That *sin* is properly the *Cause* of its *punishment*.
   And by consequence,
3. That *man* is the *procurer* of his own Misery.
   And by consequence,
4. That *Reprobation* is a *Conditional* thing.

Not decreed by God Almighty to shew his *absolute power*, but to shew his *power* in the *exercise* of his *justice*. Not Determin'd *before*, but *because* of his præscience. Nor *without regard or respect*, but in *Relation to sin*, *in foresight*, and *hatred*, and *requital* of it, as of an *injury*; on which *Damnation* is

præ-

præordain'd, by way of *Recompence* and *Revenge*. And therefore the laſt day is call'd a *day of Judgement*, as well as of *perdition*. And the Judge himſelf is called the *Lord God of Recompence*. And when the Lord Jeſus ſhall be revealed in flaming fire, it ſhall be to take *vengeance* on them that know not God, and that obey not the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt. Now that which is *the motive* to the *taking of vengeance*, was alſo the *motive* to the *making of the Decree*. He who *therefore takes vengeance, becauſe they obey not the Goſpel of Chriſt*, did for the very ſame *Reaſon*, *Decree to take it*. Whi h to me is *Demonſtration* that the *Decree* is *Conditional*. Ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

2 Pet. 3. 7. Jer. 51. 56. 2 Theſſ. 1. 8.

36. I have nothing now of *Duty* that lies upon me to be done, but that I deſcend to the *ſecond ground* of my *Belief*. But for the love of *Charity* and *Reconcilement*, I will endevour to take a Courſe of making ſome *Compoſition* with my *Diſſenters*. If they will but come up to my moſt *Reaſonable Demands*, we will not ſtrive about *words* and *phraſes*; ſo ſmall a thing ſhall *never part us*. I will *ſwallow* the word [*Neceſſity*,] ſo I may take it down with a *grain of ſalt*. I will ſay with Mr. *Whitaker* (in his 4. *Article* at *Lambeth*) *That they who are not prædeſtin'd to ſalvation ſhall be neceſſarily Damn'd* (but) *for their ſins*. (as he himſelf ſpeaks.) I allow my ſelf to be *no wiſer* then *Biſhop Andrews*, (the *ſtrings* of whoſe *books* I am not worthy to *untie*) who interprets *Neceſſariò*, not by an *abſolute Neceſſity*, but by a *Neceſſity which followes ſin*. They ſhall be damn'd *for their ſins*; that is, *for that very Reaſon, becauſe they have ſin'd*, not for that *only* Reaſon, *becauſe they are not prædeſtin'd*. And becauſe that *Reverend*, (I know not whether more *learned*, or *Saintlike*) *Man*, allow'd himſelf to be no wiſer then all the *Fathers and Schoolmen* that went before him, he thought 'twas fit to abſtain from [ſuch *καινοφωνίαι*] ſuch *new phraſes* and waies of *holding forth* and *making out* the *Ancient Doctrines* of the Church; and therefore in ſtead of [*neceſſity*] to ſay [*without doubt*.] And for my own part, I deſire to be *no deeper*, and to ſpeak *no better language*, then all the *Fathers of the Church* (who have gone to *Heaven* with thoſe *opinions*, for which I am *Cenſur'd* by *ſome* to *Hell*,) I chooſe to ſay [a *Conditional*, not an *abſolute Neceſſity*.]

An obvious expedient to reconcile diſſenters.

Qui non ſunt prædeſtinati ad ſalutem, neceſſario propter peccata condemnabuntur. Arc. Lamb. 4.

Atqui id neceſſariò (*ſi ſic loqui placeat*) *ſed* neceſſi ate ex hypotheſi, non Abſolu a. *Id eſt, ideo* q ia peccarunt, *non autem* i deo, *quia non ſunt prædeſtinati.* Epiſt. Wint Jud. de art Lamb.

If

37. If I may gueſſe (without cenſure) at the *Cauſe* of other mens *miſtakes*, by that which once was mine *own*, I ſhall aſcribe much of it to the vulgar *miſconception* of Gods *præſcience* or *foreſight*. Which being *conſtant* and *infallible*, ſeems to give a *neceſſity* to all *events*, which are the objects of that *præſcience*. And this muſt certainly be the reaſon, (I at leaſt muſt *ſo conjecture*, who can think of no *better*, and did my ſelf *once ſtumble* upon this very *ſtone*) why Mr. *Calvin* will have Gods *præſcience* to ſucceed his *præordination*. The *ground* of which *error* does ſo border upon *Truth*, as to leſſen the wonder why men of *good parts* ſhould ſo frequently *miſtake* it for that truth it ſelf, on which it *borders*. (And does unluckily verifie the *Italian Proverb*, *Troppo confina la vertù col vitio,*) Gods *præſcience* indeed doth *imply* a *neceſſity*, which it is miſtaken to have *effected*. And again *neceſſity* is not by every body *diſtinguiſht*, as by the *Admirable Boethius:* (to whom I owe my greateſt *light* in this particular.) for if it were, I beleeve many others might be *converted*, as *I* have *been*. But before I *mention*, (much leſſe *inſiſt* on the *Diſtinction*) I ſhall chooſe to ſay ſomething in *preparation* to it. It is briefly this.

The probable cauſe of the Diſſenſion is a miſtake of Gods præſcience.

38. That the *knowledge* of the *Eternal* far tranſcending all *motion* and ſucceſſion of *time*, does abide in the *ſimplicity* of its *preſent* being; beholding all *paſt* and *future* things in his *ſimple knowledge*, as *juſt now* done. And therefore *Boethius* will have it call'd not *Præſcience*, but *Science*. Not *Prævidence*, but *Providence*: which doth not change the *natures* and *proprieties* of things *future*, but conſiders them as they *are*, in *reſpect of himſelf*; which is as they *ſhall be*, in *reſpect of Time*. For as the *knowledge* of things *preſent* doth import no *Neceſſity* on that which *is done*; ſo the *foreknowledge* of *things future* layes no *neceſſity* on that which *ſhall be*: becauſe whoſoever either *knowes* or *ſees* things, he *knows* and ſees them as *they are*, and not as they *are not*. Gods knowledge doth not *confound* things, but reaches to all *events*, not only *which* come to paſſe, but *as* they come to paſſe: whether *contingently*, or *neceſſarily*. As (for illuſtration) when I ſee a *man walk* upon the *earth*, and at the very ſame inſtant, the *Sun ſhining* in the *Heavens*, I ſee the, firſt as *voluntary*, and the ſecond as *natural*. And though

The miſtake is endevoured to be rectified.

Boethius de conſol. Philoſoph. lib. 5.

though at the inſtant that I ſee *both done*, there is a *neceſſity* that they *be done* (or elſe I could not ſee them when I *do*) yet there was a neceſſity of *one only*, before they were done, (viz. the *Suns ſhining in the Heavens*) but none at all of the *other*, (viz. the *mans walking upon the earth.*) The Sun could not *but ſhine*, as being a *natural agent*; The man might *not have walked*, as being a *voluntary* one. Upon which it followes,

39. There is a *twofold neceſſity*. Whereof one is *abſolute*, and the other on *Suppoſition*. The *Abſolute* is that, by which a thing *muſt* be *moved* when ſomething *moves it*. The *Suppoſitive* is that, by which a man ſhall be *damn'd* if he die *Impenitent*. The *latter neceſſity* (though not the *firſt*) does mightily well conſiſt both with the *liberty of man's will*, and God's *Conditional Decrees*. *E.G.* I am *now writing*, and God *foreſaw* that I am writing, yet it does not follow that I *muſt needs write*; for I can chooſe. What God foreſees *muſt neceſſarily* come to paſſe, but it muſt come to paſſe *in the ſame manner that he foreſees it*. He foreſees I will write, not of *neceſſity* but *choice*; ſo that his *foreſight* doth not *make* an *abſolute* and *peremptory Neceſſity*, but *infers* a *Neceſſity* upon *Suppoſition*. (We muſt mark, in a *Parentheſis*, how great a difference there is betwixt the *making*, and the *inferring* of a Neceſſity.) Whatſoever I do, there is an *Abſolute Neceſſity* that God ſhould *foreſee*; yet God foreſeeing my *voluntary Action* does not make it *neceſſary*, but on *ſuppoſition* that it is *done*. If all things are *preſent* to God, (as indeed they are) *his foreſight* muſt needs be all one with *our ſight*. As therefore when I ſee a man *daunce as he pleaſes*, it is *neceſſary* that he *do* what I *ſee* he *does*; but yet my *looking on* does not *make* it *neceſſary*; So Gods *foreſeeing* that man *would ſin*, implyed a *certainty* that ſo it would be, but did not make it an *abſolutely neceſſary* or *involuntary* thing. For that a thing may be *certain* (in reſpect of its *event*) and yet *not neceſſary* (in reſpect of its *cauſe*) is no newes at all to a conſidering perſon, who will but duly diſtinguiſh Gods *Omniſcience* from his *Omnipotence*, and his *Foreſight* from his *Decree*, and *infallible* from *neceſſary*, and *ſpontaneous* from *voluntary*, and that which *follow's* as a *Conſequence*

By the conſideration of a twofold neceſſity in event.

Duæ ſunt neceſſitates. Simplex una, veluti quòd neceſſe eſt omnes homines eſſe mortales. Altera conditionis, *ut ſi aliquem ambulare ſcias, cum ambulare neceſſe eſt.* Boeth. de con. Phil. l. 5.

only,

only, from that which *follow's* as a *conſequent*. If I may judge by thoſe *errors* which I convince my ſelf to have been in, when I was contrary minded to what I am, I ſee as many *miſtakes* in other men ariſing from the *misfortune* of *confounding* thoſe things which I juſt now *diſtinguiſht*, as from any one *unhappineſſe* that I can think of. And from all that I have ſpoken upon this laſt ſubject, it ſeems inevitably to follow, that a *ſuppoſitive Neceſſity*, and *none elſe*, is very conſiſtent with a *free and contingent Action*. Whileſt I *ſee* a man *ſitting*, it is *neceſſary* that he *ſit*, but upon *ſuppoſition* that I *ſee* him *ſitting*. His *poſture* is ſtill a voluntary *contingent* thing. For he *ſate down* when he *would*, and may *ariſe* when he *pleaſeth*. (but ſtill with a *proviſo* of God's *Permiſſion*.) I deſire to be taught what *is*, if this is not, *exact ſpeaking*, viz. That God by his *prohibition* under *penalty* makes my *Diſobedience* become liable to *puniſhment*. And by his *Decree* to *permit*, or *not hinder* me, he *leaves me in the hand of mine own counſel*, and ſo in the ſtate of *peccability*, that I may *ſin* and *periſh* if I *will*. So that by his *præſcience* that *I will ſin* he hath no manner of *influence* or *cauſality* upon my *ſin*; which infers my *deſtruction* to be entirely from *my ſelf*. I am a little confident, that whoſoever ſhall but read *Boethius* his *fifth book*, and reading ſhall *underſtand* it, and underſtanding ſhall have the *modeſty* to *retract* an *error*, he will not reverence the 4. *Section* of the 23. *chapter* of the 3. *book* of *Inſtitutions*, becauſe it is Mr. *Calvins*, but will *ſuſpect* Mr. *Calvin* becauſe of that *Section*. The Queſtion there is, [*Whether Reprobates were prædeſtined to that corruption which is the cauſe of Damnation*] To which he anſwers with a [*Fateor*] *I confeſſe that all the ſons of Adam, by the expreſſe will of God, fell down into the miſery of that condition in which they are fetter'd and intangled.* And a little after he profeſſeth, that no accompt can be given, but by *having recourſe to the ſole will of God*, the *cauſe of which lies hidden within it ſelf*. And that we may not think he ſpeaketh only of the *poſterity* of *Adam*, he telleth us plainly in the *cloſe* of that *Section*, *that no other cauſe can be given for the defection of Angels*, then that God did *reprobate* and *reject them*. In this place I would aske, Was the Angels *Defection* or *Apoſtaſie* their *ſin*, or *no*? if *not*, why were they *reprobated* and *caſt*

Eccles. 15.14.

into

into *chaines* of *darkneſſe*? and if it were, how then is *God's Reprobation* not only the *chief*, but the *only Cauſe* of *ſuch* a *ſin*? This is the *ſad effect* of being *enſlaved* to an *opinion*, and of being *aſham'd* of that liberty which looks like *being conquer'd*. I beleeve the *love of victory* hath been the cauſe of as many *miſchiefs* as have been feigned to leap forth from *Pandora's Box*. Whereas if every one that *writes*, would but think it a noble and an *honourable* thing, to *lead* his own *pride captive*, to triumph over his own *conceitedneſſe* and *opiniaſtrete*, and to purſue the *glory* of a *well natur'd ſubmiſſion*; there is perhaps hardly an *Author* of any conſiderable *length*, but might think he had reaſon to write a *book* of *Retractations*. And ſure it will not be immodeſty for a *young* man to ſay, That many *old men* might have done it, with as much reaſon as S. *Auſtin*.

40. But as I have learnt of *Boethius* (that moſt excellent *Chriſtian*, as well as *Senator*; and *profound Divine*, as well as *Philoſopher*; who lived a *Terror* to *Hereſie*, and died a *Martyr* for the *Truth*) to diſtinguiſh of *Neceſſity*; ſo have I learn't from other *Antients*, to diſtinguiſh better of God's *will*, then I was wont to do before the time of my *Retractation*. First, I diſtinguiſh (with S. *Chryſoſtome*) of a *firſt* and *ſecond* will. Gods *firſt will* is, that *the ſinner ſhould not die*, but *return rather from his wickedneſſe* and *live*. His *ſecond will* is, that he who *refuſeth to return* receive the *wages of iniquity*. Secondly, I diſtinguiſh (with *Damaſcene*) of an *antecedent* and a *conſequent will*. The *antecedent* is that, by which he wils that *every ſinner ſhould repent*. His *conſequent* is that, by which he *preordaineth* the *Damnation* of the *impenitent*. Which diſtinction is not made in reſpect of *Gods will ſimply* (in which there cannot be either *prius* or *poſterius*) but in reſpect of the things which are the *object* of his *will*. For every thing is *will'd* by God ſo far forth as it is *good*. Now a thing *conſider'd abſolutely* may be *good* or *evill*, which in a *comparative conſideration* may be quite contrary. E. G. *To ſave the life of a man*, is *good*; and to *deſtroy a man*, is *evil*, in a *firſt* and *abſolute conſideration*. But if a man ſecondly be *compared* with his having been a *murderer*, then to *ſave* his life, is *evil*; and to *deſtroy* it, *good*. From whence it may

And by a right Application of a twofold Will in the Almighty.

Chryſoſt. in Epiſt ad Eph. c. 1. Homil. 1.

Damaſcen. l 2. Orth. Fid. c. 29.

be ſaid of a *juſt Judge*, that by his *antecedent will* he *deſires* every man ſhould *live*; but by a *conſequent will decrees* the *death* of the *Murderer*. And even then, he doth ſo diſtinguiſh the *murderer* from the *man*, that he wiſheth the *man* were *not* a *murderer*. Whom he condemns as *murderer*, and not as *man*. For whileſt he hath a *will* to *hang* the *murderer*, he hath a merciful *wouldng* to *ſave* the *man*. He doth not *hang* the *man*, but only becauſe he is a *murderer*. And (if it lay in his power) he would *deſtroy* the *murderer*, to *ſave* the *man*. Both the one and the other is not an *abſolute*, but a *conditional will*. He *would* ſave the man, (with an) [if] he were not a murderer. And *doth deſtroy* the *murderer* (with a) *becauſe* he is a *Malefactor*. Juſt ſo, God's *antecedent will* is, that every man *would repent* that they may *not periſh*. It is his *conſequent will*, that every one may *periſh* who will *not repent*. Both the one and the other is *reſpective* and *conditional*. Thirdly, I diſtinguiſh (with *Proſper*) of an *inviting* and *revenging will*. The *inviting* will is that, by which *all* are bidden to the *Wedding Feaſt*; his *revenging* will is that, by which he puniſheth thoſe that *will not come*. Or fourthly, I diſtinguiſh (with reverend *Anſelme*) of the *will* of *God's mercy*, and of the *will* of his *Juſtice*. It is the *will* of his *Mercy*, that Chriſt ſhould die for the ſins of *all*; but 'tis the *will* of his *Juſtice*, that *all* ſhould periſh who *come not in to him*, when they are *called*, or who only *ſo* come, as not to *continue* and *perſevere unto the end*.

Proſper. in Reſpon. ad objec. Vincen. ſub fi-nem.

Anſelmus in Mat. cap. 6.

41. All theſe *Diſtinctions* come to *one* and the *ſame purpoſe*, and being *rightly underſtood*, as well as *dexterouſly uſed*, do ſeem to me a *Gladius Delphicus*, ſufficient to *cut aſunder* the chiefeſt *knots* in this Queſtion. For the *firſt* will of God may be *repealed*, whereas the *ſecond* is *immutable*. Which is the ground of that Diſtinction betwixt the *Threats* and *Promiſes* under God's *Oath*, and thoſe other under his *Word* only. Of which ſaith the *Councel* of *Toledo*, *Jurare Dei eſt, à ſeipſo ordinata, nullatenus convellere. Pœnitere verò, eadem ordinata, cùm voluerit, immutare. When* he is reſolv'd to *execute* his *purpoſe*, he is ſaid to *ſwear*; and when it *pleaſeth* him to *alter it*, he is ſaid to *repent*. For there are ſome Decrees of God which (being conditional) do *never come to paſſe*; as he *thought* to have done an *Evil of puniſhment*

Concil. Tolet. 8. c. 2.

puniſhment unto Iſrael, which yet he *did not*. *Exod.* 32. 14. And the reaſon of this is given us from that *diſtinction* before mentioned. Which alſo ſerveth to *reconcile* many *ſeeming repugnances* in *Scripture*. For when it is ſaid, that *God repenteth* (1 *Sam.* 16. 35) it is meant of the *firſt will*; and when it is ſaid *he cannot repent* (1 *Sam.* 16. 29.) it is meant of the *ſecond*. In reſpect of the *firſt*, we are ſaid to *grieve*, to *quench*, to *reſiſt* the Spirit of God, (1 *Theſ.* 5. 19.) but when it is ſaid, *who hath reſiſted his will?* (*Rom.* 9. 19.) it is meant of the *ſecond*. God's *Mercy* is *above* and *before* his *Juſtice*, and therefore that is his *firſt will*, that *all ſhould be ſaved and come to the knowledge of the Truth* (1 *Tim.* 2. 4.) but yet ſo, as that his *Juſtice* is not *excluded* by his *Mercy*, and therefore that is his *ſecond Will*, that *ſo many ſhould be damned as hated knowledge and did not chooſe the fear of the Lord.* (*Prov.* 1. 29.) The will of his *Mercy*, *that all ſhould live*, is from nothing but his *goodneſſe*; whereas the will of his *Juſtice*, *that ſome ſhould die*, *depends* upon ſomething in the *Creature*. (So that *both parties* may be gratified, they that are for the *dependence*, and *the independency* of his *Will*.) That the Reprobate is *invited*, is from the *mercy* of *God*'s Will; but that he is *puniſhed* for *not accepting*, is from the *obliquity* of his *own*. In reſpect of the *firſt*, it *is the man* that *refuſeth God* (*Jer.* 8. 5.) But in reſpect of the *ſecond*, it is the *God* that doth *reprobate man*. (*Rom.* 1. 28.) The *free Love* of the *Creator* is the *only motive* to his *firſt will*; but man's *ingratitude* and *rebellion* is his *impellent* to the *ſecond*. The *firſt* ſhewes him a *tender* and *compaſſionate Father*; the *ſecond* ſpeaks him a *righteous* and an *impartial Judge*. *Both* proclaim him a *powerful and a provident God*. Now can any *Diſtinction* be better *choſen*, can any *word* that is *æquivocable* be more *ſafely underſtood*, can any *Opinion* (of *God's* will, or *mans*) be more *rationally*, or more *warily*, or more *religiouſly* entertain'd, then *that* wherein God's *Mercy* doth *greet* his *Juſtice?* and wherein his *Love* doth *kiſſe* his *Power?* I *appeal* to any man living, whether this be an *Error*, or if it is, whether it is not a very *ſafe one*; and if it is ſo, whether it is not a very *ſmall* one; and if ſo *ſafe*, that no body can *ſuffer* by it; if ſo *ſmal*, that no body can *ſee it*; whether the *Author* of this *Appeal* is not

very *excuſable*, both for not being able to *ſee* his *own Eyes*, nor to *ſee* his *own Error* with other *mens*. As much as in me
Rom. 12. 18 lies, *I would live peaceably with all men*. With thoſe eſpecially, who *when I ſpeak unto them thereof, make them ready to battle*. And in order to that *Peace*, I deſire them to lay this one thing to heart. That as, if *I* were as *they*, I would *quit my Opinion*; ſo, if *they* were as *I*, they would not long *keep their own*.

CHAP.

Chap. IV.

42. HAving proved hitherto, that *Sin* is really the *cauſe* of *Puniſhment*, that *Man* is really the *cauſe* of *Sin*, and therefore that *Man* is the *grand cauſe* of *Puniſhment*, (as being the *cauſe* of the *cauſe* of his *Damnation*) intending thereby to *ſecure* my ſelf againſt the errors and blacker guilt of the *Manichees*, the *Marcionites*, the *Stoicks*, and the *Turks*, who do all affirm (ſome *directly*, ſome by *neceſſary conſequence*) That *God's abſolute Will* is the *cauſe* of *ſin*, and *man's* only the *inſtrument*; the *ſecond part* of my *Task* is to be an *Advocate* for the *pleading* and aſſerting the *Cauſe* of *God* too; and that againſt the *Opiners* of the *other Extreme*, to wit, the *Pelagians* and the *Maſſilienſes*; who, to be *liberal* to *Nature*, do *take away* from *Grace*; and to *ſtrengthen* the *Handmaid*, do *leſſen* the *forces* of the *Miſtreſſe*. And though I think the *latter* to be the *milder Hereſie* of the *two*, it being *leſſe dangerous* to aſcribe *too much goodneſſe* to the *Power* of *Nature*, (which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God) then the very *leaſt Evil* to the *God of all Grace*, (and this according to the Judgement of the *Synod* at *Orange*, which pronounced an *Anathema* upon the firſt *Hereſie*, whereas it did but *civilly reject* the *ſecond*) yet in a *perfect diſlike* and *rejection* of this latter *Extremity*, as well as of the former, my *ſecond Principle* is this.

That *all* the *good* which I *do*, I do firſt *receive*; not from any thing in *my ſelf*, but from the *ſpecial Grace* and *Favour* of *Almighty God*. Who freely *worketh in me*, both to *will*, and to *do*, of his *good pleaſure*, Phil. 2. 13. *The ſecond Principle or Ground* of my Belief in this buſineſſe.

43. That I may not be ſuſpected of any *ſecret Reſervation* within my ſelf, in the laying down of this *Principle*; I will endevour to *ſpeak out*, and make my *Reader* my *Confeſſor*, by revealing the very *utmoſt* of what I think in *this buſineſſe*. *I believe*, that *no man* can come to *Heaven* any otherwiſe then by *Chriſt*; nor to *Chriſt*, unleſſe it be *given*; (that is, unleſſe *Explained.*

Act. 4. 12. Joh. 6. 44. 65. leſſe the *Father draw him.*) First the *Father* loves the *Son*; next he loves *us in* the *Son*; then *endowes* us with his *Spirit*; *ſo* endow'd he *elects* us; *ſo elected* he *prædeſtines* us; ſo *prædeſtin'd* he will *glorifie* us; by *crowning* his *Gifts* and *Graces in* us. I ſay *his Graces*, becauſe they are not *acquired* by *us*, but *infus'd* by *him*. Nor ſo properly *given*, as *lent* us. Lent us as *Talents*, not to *hide*, but *multiply*. We owe it wholly to God, not that he gives us his his *Grace* only, but that he gives us the *grace* to *deſire* his *Grace*, as well as to uſe it to the advancement of his Glory. And we are to *thank* him, as for all other mercies, ſo for this alſo, *even that we have the Grace to thank him.* So far am I from that *Pelagianiſm* whereof I have *wrongfully* been *accuſed*, (I beſeech God not *to lay it to my Accuſers charge*) that I have never lain under any the leaſt *Temptation* to any *degree* of that *Hereſie*. No, no more, then *Fulgentius*, or *Proſper*, or S. *Auſtin himſelf*. It not only *is*, but *ever hath been* my *aſſertion*, That as we cannot *ſpiritually* be *nouriſhed* unleſſe the *Father of Mercies* doth *reach out unto us the Bread of Heaven*; and as we cannot *take* it when it is *offered*, unleſſe he *give* us the *hand* of *Faith*; ſo cannot we poſſibly *deſire* to take it, unleſſe he gives us our very *appetite* and *hunger*. We cannot *pant* after the *waters of life*, unleſſe he give us our very *thirſt*. He *ſtirs us up*, when we are *ſleeping*, that we may *ſeek him*; and *ſhews* himſelf, when we are *ſeeking*, that we may *finde him*; and gives us *ſtrength*, when we have *found* him, that we may *hold him faſt unto the end*. There is no *good thought* ariſing in us, unleſſe ſuggeſted by his *preventing Grace*. No nor *increaſing*, unleſſe *ſtrengthned* by his *ſubſequent Grace*. No nor *conſummate*, unleſſe *perfected* by his *Grace* of *perſeverance*. If I am *better* then *any man*, it is *God* that *makes* me *differ*. *Every good gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights.* And therefore *he that will glory, let him glory in the Lord*, ſaying with the Pſalmiſt, *Not unto us O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give the praiſe.*

1 Cor. 4. 7. Jam. 1. 17. 1 Cor. 1. 31. Pſal. 115. 1.

44. *Reconciled with Choice, which is irreconcilable with Ireſiſtibility.* Having thus *ſecur'd* my ſelf from giving the *Will* of *Man* a *ſacrilegious Liberty*; I muſt withall provide, that I be able to *anſwer* the *Objection* of the *Marcionites*; which *Tertullian* could not do, but by *aſſerting* the *liberty* of the *Will*. Which *Grace* doth

doth *correct*, but not *destroy*. Grace doth *strengthen*, but not *compell*. *Grace* doth *guide*, but not *necessitate*. *Grace makes able* to *choose good*, but not *unable* to *refuse it*. *Marcion* objected thus. *If God is good, and præscient of all the Evil which is to come, and withal able to prevent it, why did he suffer mankinde to fall?* why did he not *hold him fast* by *irresistible Grace?* *Tertullian* answered, *That God made man in his own Image*, and that in nothing more *lively*, then in the *liberty of a Will*. *And to that it is to which his fall must be imputed*. But (saith *Marcion*) *Man ought* to have been made of *such a frame*, as *not to be able to fall away*. Marry then (saith *Tertullian*) *Man* had not been a *voluntary*, but a *necessary Agent*. (which is as much as to say, *a Man should not have been a Man*.) *Nor could have been a right object of Reward and Punishment*.

Object. 1. Si Deus bonus & præscius mali, & potens depellere, cur hominem labi passus est? Resp. liberum & sui arbitrii & suæ potestatis invenio hominem. & seqq.

Object. 2. Homo ita debuit institui, ut non posset cadere. Resp. Ergo bonum suum haberet emancipatum sibi à Deo. Et bonus aut malus necessitate fuisset inventus, non voluntate. Nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei. Tertull. advers. Marc. l. 2. c. 5, 6.

45. Before I venture on any *rational*, or *Scholastical* way of *arguing*, I must first *enlighten* my self out of some *clear* places of *Scripture*. Amongst which there is none that seems more proper, then that of S. *Paul* to the *Philippians*. *Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you, both to will, and to do, of his good pleasure.* He bids *them work, because God worketh*, which they needed not have been bid to do, if God had *work*t after a *physical irresistible* manner. That they might not be betray'd into a *yawning reliance* upon their being *superacted* to the *working out* of their *salvation*, he bids them work it out with *fear and trembling*. (as our Saviour bids us, *Strive to enter in at the strait Gate*, because *many shall strive*, and *shall not enter*.) which they needed not have done, had their salvation been (not only *certain*, but withall) *a necessary unavoidable thing*, and so inconsistent with *choice* and *option*. But the Apostle tels them (in the *next verse*) that it is *God* which worketh in them, not *only to do*, but to *will*, and to *do*; by his *preventing Grace* he worketh in them to *will*; by *assisting Grace* he worketh in them *to do*: by neither so *irresistibly*, but that they must *work it out themselves too*; and that not only with *expectation* and *hope*, but with *fear* and *trembling*. God *worketh in us* to *will* (saith the *Apostle*) not *without*, or *against*, but *according to* the *nature* of that very *will* with

1. Proved by Scripture. Phil. 2. 12, 13.

 which

which he *made us*. *Grace* doth not *deſtroy*, but *eſtabliſh*, and *ſtrengthen*, and *perfect Nature*. Shall we ſay that we do a thing *without liberty* and *choice*, becauſe God *worketh in us* to *will* and *to do?* (that is) to do it by *choice* and *option?* is the liberty *loſt*, becauſe it is *guided* and *enabled* to do that which is good? if I *can do all things through Chriſt that ſtrengthens me*, then can I (*through him*) both *refuſe* the *evil*, and *chooſe* the *Good*. Which would not be *choice*, if it were *whether I would or no*. And *ſo* it would be, were I *unable* to *reſiſt it*. (as I ſhall ſhew by and by in the open confeſſion of Dr. *Twiſſe*, whoſe *Favourers* cannot be angry with one that ſpeaks his language.) *I can do all things through him that ſtrengthens me*, (ſaith the *Apoſtle*) now *to ſtrengthen*, is not to *neceſſitate*. For then *to ſtrengthen* would be *to weaken*. Becauſe to *neceſſitate* or *compel* with an *irreſiſtibility*, is to *vanquiſh*, and *over-maſter*; not to *give ſtrength*, but rather to *take it away*. Again, our Saviour is ſaid *to tread down Satan under our feet*. To what end doth he *tread* the Serpent *down*, but that we may have the *freedome* to *trample on him?* and though he doth it *with his own feet*, yet it is *under ours*. This *liberty* and *freedome* of the *regenerate will*, is at once *expreſſed* and *expounded* in thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, *I will run the way of thy Commandements, when thou ſhalt ſet my heart at liberty*. To which is agreeable that of our Saviour, *and the truth ſhall make you free*. It being a great *abſurdity* (in the opinion of *Tertullian*) *that a man ſhould have his happineſſe forced on him by God Almighty*. So far is God from *proſtituting* his *Bleſſing*, by ſuch a *controlling* of the *will*, and ſuch an *obtruding* of the *object*, as makes the *object unavoidable*, that he doth not only *offer* and *propoſe* it to his peoples *choice*, but *deſires* them alſo *to chooſe it*. *I call heaven and earth to record this day againſt you* (ſaith God by *Moſes*) *that I have ſet before you Life and Death, bleſſing and curſing. Therefore chooſe life, that thou and thy ſeed may live*. But *chooſe* we *cannot*, if God works in us *irreſiſtibly*; as I will farther prove by *Reaſon*.

* That is properly called *irreſiſtible*, which is of ſuch an *overruling* and *prevailing force*, that a man *cannot withſtand* it, although he *would*. (And thus Dr. *Twiſſe* hath well *defin'd* it)

Upon

Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia neceſſitate trahimur. Alioqui ubi neceſſitas, ibi nec damnatio, nec corona eſt. Hieron. contra Jovinian. l. 2.

Valet liberum arbitrium ad bona, ſi divinitus adjuvetur; quod fit, humiliter petendo & faciendo. Auguſt. epiſt. 89.

Pſal. 119. 32.

Joh. 8. 32.

Tertull. loco citato.

Deut. 30. 15, 19.

*46. 2. Proved by Reaſon.

Illud propriè dicitur irreſiſtibile, cui reſiſtere nemo poteſt, quamvis velit. Twiſſ. in præf. ad vin. Grat. §. 9. p. 31.

Upon which it followes, that to *chooſe irreſiſtibly*, is a *contradiction* in *Adjecto*. For it is to *will a thing* whether *one will or no*. He that ſaith, God *worketh* in us to *chooſe irreſiſtibly*, doth ſay in effect, He *ſo worketh* in us, as that we *cannot chooſe but chooſe*. Which is as much as to ſay, not only *that we do, what we cannot do*, but that we *therefore do it, becauſe we cannot do it*. He that cannot *chooſe but chooſe*, doth chooſe *becauſe* he cannot chooſe. Which is as bad as to ſay, that the thing is *neceſſary, becauſe* it is *impoſſible*. To make this plain to my *plaineſt Reader*, I will ſhew the *legality* of my *deduction* by theſe degrees. Firſt, he that is *wrought upon* by God (to *believe, obey*, or *perſevere*) *irreſiſtibly, cannot poſſibly* do *otherwiſe* (then *beleeve, obey*, or *perſevere*.) Secondly, he that *cannot poſſibly* do *otherwiſe* then he *doth, cannot poſſibly chooſe* but *do* what he *doth*. Thirdly, he that *cannot chooſe* but *do* what he *doth*, doth clearly *do* it *whether he will or no*. Fourthly, he that doth *beleeve, obey*, or *perſevere, whether he will or no*, doth do it by as *evident undeniable Neceſſity*, as *that* by which *a ſtone tends downward*. (Which *tendency* of the *ſtone*, though it is *ſpontaneous*, yet is it not *voluntary*, and as it is not by *violence*, ſo it is not by *choice* neither.) Fifthly, he that *willeth* to *beleeve, obey*, or *perſevere, whether he will or no*, doth do it by a *Neceſſity*, by which a *ſtone tends upwards*, when it is *thrown*. (Which *tendency* of the *ſtone* is ſo far from *voluntary*, that it is not *ſpontaneous*. It is not only an *irrational*, but an *unnatural* thing.) and beſides implies a *contradiction* in a *voluntary Agent*, which cannot take place in an *involuntary ſtone*. For to ſay, a man *willeth* to *obey* or *beleeve, whether he will or no*, is to ſay he *willeth* it either *without* his *will*, or *againſt* his *will*, or elſe *not having a will at all*. Which is as bad as to ſay, that he *muſt needs will it* becauſe he *cannot any way poſſible*. I know not any trick imaginable to eſcape the *odium* of theſe *Abſurdities*, unleſſe by denying the *definition* of *irreſiſtible*. Which were not to *eſcape*, but to *commute* abſurdities. And not only the *authority* of Dr. *Twiſſe*, but the very *force* of the *word* would *cry it down*. And ſo little is my *deduction* in a *capacity* to be *blamed*, that Doctor *Twiſſe* ſaith expreſly of *irreſiſtibility*, *it hath no place in the act of willing*. And though he pleadeth for a

In actu voluntatis locum non habet, In loco citato.

Ex hujusmodi autem operatione divinâ existit Necessitas effectûs, cum ipsâ libertate voluntatis consistens. Ibid.

Necessity which he will have to follow Gods *operation* upon the *Soul*, yet he will have that *Necessity* to be *no other*, then what may very well *agree* with the *liberty of the will*. So that if that *Doctor*, in that his *skirmish* with *Arminius*, had not *confounded* a *necessity* with a *certainty* of event, and used *that* word in stead of *this*, his *Antagonist* and *He* (in that particular) must needs have *wrangled* into *Friendship*. For *Arminius* denieth the *irresistible working* of *Grace* upon the *Will*, and so doth Dr. *Twisse*. Again Dr. *Twisse* affirmeth, that the *liberty of the will* doth agree with the *working* of *Grace* upon the *Will*, and so doth *Arminius*. And therefore I hope for no *hard usage* from such as are *haters* of *Arminius*, whilest I say the *same things* with them that *hate him*.

47. *The Ground of the opposite mistake removed.*

Me thinks the *principal Ground* of *my mistakes heretofore* in this businesse, (if I may be allowed to passe a *conjecture* upon my *self*) is the *misapprehension* of certain Texts, the *cause* of whose *misapprehension* is the *illogical confounding* of *two things*, which though they *look like one another*, are yet *exceedingly different*. *E.G.* from [*Ezek.* 26. 27. *Cant.* 1. 14. 1 *Joh.* 3. 9. *I will cause you to walk in my Statutes*, &c. *Draw me, we will run after thee. Whosoever is born of God cannot sin, because he is born of God*, and the like] many conclude that *Gods working* upon the *wils* of his *Elect*, is by such a *physical immediate immutation* of their *wils*, as doth not only produce a *certain*, but a *necessary effect*. And being *forgetful* (rather then *ignorant*) to distinguish *necessity* from *certainty* of *events*, they call that *necessary* which is but *certain* and *infallible*, and so (through *hast* or *inadvertency*) they swallow down the Error of *irresistible Grace*; using the word *irresistible* in stead of *efficacious*. And this is a *second inadvertency* begotten of the *first*; as commonly *one error* loves to *draw on another*. Now because a *fallacy* undiscerned in the *præmises* cannot possibly be *discover'd* by *gazing* only on the *Conclusion*, (just as an *error* in the *first Concoction* is hardly mended in the *second*) I must *mark out* the

48. *By rightly distinguishing betwixt Infallible and Necessary.*

difference betwixt *infallible* and *necessary*, before I can *usefully distinguish* betwixt *effectual* and *irresistible*.

Infallible properly is that, that *cannot erre*, or be *deceived*. That is properly *Necessary*, which *cannot but be*. The *first* relates

lates to the *perfection* of the *Knowledge* of God, but the *ſecond* to the *Almightineſſe* of his *will*. The *firſt* is properly applyed unto the object of God's *foreſight*, (and though 'tis otherwiſe uſed, yet 'tis by ſuch a *Catechreſis*, as I humbly conceive to be a *ſtone of ſtumbling*.) But the *ſecond* more *preciſely* unto the object of his *Decree*. The *firſt* is *conſiſtent* with thoſe *contingent events*, to which the *ſecond* is *Diametrically oppoſed*. *E.G.* That I am *now writing* is but *contingent*, becauſe I do it upon *choice*. Yet Gods *foreknowledge* of this my writing from all *Eternity* did infer that this my writing would *infallibly come to paſſe*. This *event* is *contingent*, for I can *chooſe*; but yet *infallible*, for God cannot *erre*. This *contingent* therefore doth *infallibly* come to paſſe, not by way of a *conſequent*, but by way of *conſequence*. My *writing* being not the *effect*, but the *object* only of God's *Omniſcience*. Which is, in order, *before* the *Act*. God *foreſees* a *contingent* will *contingently* come to paſſe, and therefore we infer it will *infallibly* come to paſſe, becauſe *he foreſees* it who is *infallible*. So that his *præſcience* is a *conſequent* of the thing's coming to paſſe; and its *infallibility* of coming to paſſe is *inferr'd* from his *præſcience* only by way of *conſequence*. It is one thing *to follow* as the *effect* of a *Cauſe*, in order of *Nature*; and quite another, to *follow* as the *ſequel* of an *Antecedent*, in way of *Argumentation*. The *ſhort* and *plain* upſhot of all is this. The precious *veſſels* of *Election* do very *certainly* and *infallibly* perſevere unto the end, and that by reaſon of God's *omniſcience* which cannot be *deceived*; but not of *neceſſity* and *irreſiſtibly*, by reaſon of his *omnipotence* which cannot be *fruſtrate* nor *defeated*. What God *foreſees* ſhall come to paſſe *ſhal infallibly* come to paſſe, and that becauſe he cannot *erre* who is *omniſcient*. (On the other ſide) what God *decrees* ſhall come to paſſe *muſt* come to paſſe of *neceſſity*, becauſe he cannot be *reſiſted* who is *omnipotent*.

49. Hence it is eaſie to *diſtinguiſh* betwixt the *other two things*, which have been ſo *often*, and ſo *unhappily confounded*; I mean *ſufficient*, *effectual*, and *irreſiſtible*, applyed to *Grace*. 1 *Sufficient Grace* is that, which *poſſibly may* produce that *effect* for which it is given. 2 *Effectual* is that, which *certainly will*. 3 *Irreſiſtible* is that, which *neceſſarily muſt*. That which is

Betwixt ſufficient, effectual, and unreſiſtible.

irreſiſtible doth *carry away* its *object* to what it pleaſeth, like a mighty *Torrent*, by *indiſputable force*, malgre the *greateſt oppoſition* that can be made, and therefore cannot take place in the *elections* of the *will*, which ceaſeth to *elect* after the nature of a *will*, in caſe it be made to do any thing *whether it will or no*. (as hath already been *ſhew'd* from no leſſe a *conceſſion* then that of Doctor *Twiſſe*.) But that which is only *effectual* is quite another thing, and doth *prevail* upon the *will* not *ineluctably*, but *infallibly*. It doth ſo *ſtrongly* and *effectually incline* the *will*, at ſuch *critical opportunities*, and by ſuch *congruous means*, as that the *will* doth very *certainly* and *undoubtedly aſſent*. But it doth not ſo *irreſiſtibly* and *compulſively neceſſitate*, as to take away the *freedome* and *poſſibility* of *aſſenting*, by making it do what it doth, even *whether it will or no*.

50. Betwixt *action* in *general*, and *volition* in *particular*. Betwixt *taking* and *chooſing*.

I *diſcern* the *Truth* of this *diſtinction* with greater *eaſe*, by having alwaies in my *proſpect* the very great difference betwixt the *generical* notion of *acting* or *taking*, and the *ſpecifical* notion of *willing* or *chooſing*. God indeed (if it pleaſe him) can by his *abſolute power* over his *Creature*, make him *act* this thing, or *take* that thing, by *ineluctable Neceſſity*, and *whether he will or no*. But then that *acting* is not *volition*, and that *taking* is not *choice*. For the very word *choice* cannot be *apprehended* but it muſt carry along with it a *ſound* of *freedome*. *Optio* muſt be *optimorum*, and ſo *duorum* at leaſt. It is of *two things* or *more*, that we *chooſe* the *beſt*, whether in *reality*, or in *appearance*. And this *liberty* of the *will*, by which we *chooſe*, being acknowledged on all ſides, (as well by Mr. *Perkins* and Dr. *Twiſſe*, as by *Bellarmine* and *Arminius*, as every man knows that hath but *read* and *compar'd* them) that famous *diſtinction* of a *twofold Neceſſity*, the one of *coaction*, and the other of *infallibility*, (being built upon a *manifeſt* and *groſſe miſtake* both of the word *Neceſſity*, and the word *Infallibility*,) ſeems to me to be ſerviceable to no other end, then to *cover* a *wound*, which 'tis impoſſible to *cure*. But admit of that *diſtinction* of a *twofold Neceſſity*, or admit a *Neceſſity* be *twentifold*, yet ſtill it ceaſeth not to have the nature of a *Neceſſity*. If it is *abſolutely Neceſſary* that I *muſt* go to *London*, it doth not

not ceaſe to be *Neceſſity*, becauſe I am *drawn* rather then *driven*. *Conſtion* and *infallibility*, if they do both imply an *abſolute* and *peremptory Neceſſity*, (and ſo by conſequence an *irreſiſtibility*, and ſo by conſequence are *oppoſed* to the *elective* faculty of the *Will*,) it is no matter how they differ in their *ſyllables* and their *ſounds*. Shall I declare my *Judgement* then, (although in *weakneſſe*, yet in *ſincerity*) how *freewill* is *neceſſary* to the *chooſing* of *good*, to which, *without Grace*, it is *altogether inſufficient*? My judgement is, that it is *neceſſary*, not as a *Cauſe*, but as a *Condition*. Not as that, *by vertue of which*, we can *do* any thing that *good* is; but as that, *without which*, we cannot *chooſe* it. God's *Grace* alone is the *cauſe* of the *good*, but *man's will* is as really the *inſtrument* of the *choice*. We can *do* good, as God's *Engines*, *without a will*; and ſo did *Balaams Aſſe* without a *Reaſon*. But we cannot *chooſe* good, without a *freewill*, as that *Aſſe* could not poſſibly *underſtand* what ſhe *ſpake*, *without* a *Ratiocination*. This ſeems to me to be as *plain* as the *light*. And now I ſpeak of the *light*, (if my *Reader* pleaſe) by that *light* I will make it *plain*. We know the Sun is the *fountain* or *Cauſe* of *light*. And *light* the only *means* by which we *ſee*. But yet the *opening* of the *Eye-lid* is a *neceſſary condition*, becauſe if I *wink*, I am *dark* at *noon*. And if my *Eyelid* is *held open* by ſuch a *power* as I cannot *reſiſt*, my *Eye* in that caſe cannot *chooſe but ſee*, and therefore cannot *chooſe to ſee*. My ſight may be with *delectation*, but not properly with that which is call'd *election*. Thus if a man be never ſo much *delighted* in doing good, but (by reaſon of *neceſſity*) cannot poſſibly *but do it*, it is God that *chooſeth* that good, and the man doth only *act* it. I ſay *God chooſeth*, by a *catachreſtical* way of ſpeaking, meerly the better to *ſhew* my *thoughts*. For though God did *chooſe* to *make a world*, and *one* world, becauſe it was in his power to have made *many worlds*, or *none at all*; yet I conceive it *abſurd*, to ſay that God did *chooſe* to *be good*, or that he *chooſeth* to *do good*, (in oppoſition to *evil*) becauſe he *is good*, and *doth good* by an *abſolute neceſſity*; he cannot *chooſe to be*, or *to do*, any *otherwiſe*. And ſo he *loves*, but doth not *chooſe* it. For if that were *true ſpeaking*, it would be as *true ſpeaking* to ſay, that God doth will his

being.

being and *doing good whether he will or no*; or that he *cannot choose but choose*. Which is ſure very *childiſh untoward ſpeaking*. Only he *chooſeth* to *enable us* to *do* it, becauſe he can *chooſe*, whether he *will* ſo *enable* us, or *not*. When he *giveth* us his *Grace*, he hath the *power* to *withhold* it; when he *continueth* his *Grace*, he hath the *power* to *withdraw* it; therefore doth he *chooſe* both to *give* and to *continue* it. The *goodneſſe* of his *eſſence* is not *arbitrary* and *elective*, but *ſpontaneous* and *natural*. Whereas the *goodneſſe* of his *effects* in all his *Creatures* is not *naturally neceſſary* in reſpect of him, but *arbitrary* and *elective*, meerly depending upon his *choice* and *pleaſure*. For he *gave* us our *goodneſſe when we would*, and may *take it away* when he *pleaſeth*. To *underſtand* this the *better*, and to *hold* it the *faſter* in my *underſtanding*.

Betwixt *voluntary* and *ſpontaneous*.

51. I muſt carefully *diſtinguiſh* betwixt *ſpontaneum* (that which is *of its own accord*) and *voluntarium*, (that which is *freely* and upon *choice*.) The *firſt* is *agreeable* to *inanimate* creatures, the *ſecond* only to *rational*. *That* is properly *oppos'd* to *violence*, but *reconcilable* with *neceſſity*, to which *this* is *oppos'd*. *E. G.* A ſtone *tends downwards* by a *natural*, and *neceſſary*, and *ſpontaneous* motion. It tends downwards of *neceſſity*, becauſe it *cannot but do* ſo. And yet *ſpontaneouſly*, becauſe it doth it *without violence*, and *of its own accord*. But yet that motion is not *voluntary*, nor doth the *ſtone chooſe* that kinde of *tendency*, becauſe it could not *refuſe* it, as not being furniſht with the *liberty* of a *will*. Thus when I made my entrance out of the *womb* into the *world*, I did not *chooſe* to go *forwards*, becauſe I had *not* the *power* to ſtay *behinde*. I did it as a *ſpontaneous*, not as a *voluntary* Agent. But now that I am capable either of *virtue*, or of *vice*, and do *purſue* the *one*, in *refuſal* of the *other*, I do it not only in a *ſpontaneous*, but in a *voluntary* manner. We have the *perfect character* of a *voluntary Agent* in that admirable *παράδειγμα* of the *Son of Syrach*. *The Lord left man in the hand of his Counſel; if thou wilt, to keep the Commandements. He hath ſet fire and water before thee; ſtretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh ſhal be given him.* I dare not (like *Marcion*) be more inquiſitive, why God made man with ſuch a freedome of

Eccleſiaſticus 15 13,14,15, 16,17.

of *willing* or *nilling*, then why he made the hand with thoſe *two Muſcles*, whereof the *one* doth move *to the taking* of a thing, and the *other*, to the *throwing of it away*.

52. Having ſpoken all this in order to the clearing of *reſiſtibility* of the *working* of *Grace* in God's *Elect*, I think I cannot do better then to *apply* my reaſoning to *two examples* (at leaſt as much of it as ſhall be needfull) whereof one muſt be the *Protoplaſt before* his *Fall*, and the other muſt be one of his *poſterity* whom we are very well aſſur'd to have been one of God's *Elect*. *Adam* was made in a ſtate of *Innocence*, and (God not requiring any *impoſſibilities*, as *brick* without *ſtraw*) had grace enough to have performed a moſt *adæquate obedience* to God's *Command*. Which if he had *not reſiſted*, how could he have *ſin'd*? and if that *meaſure* of *Grace* was leſſen'd before he *ſin'd*, how was the *taking away* of *Grace* any *puniſhment* of his *Fall*? or how was he then in the *ſtate* of *innocence*? If he was not, then was he *ſinful before* he *ſin'd*. God doth not *take away* his *Grace*, unleſſe to *puniſh* the *abuſe* of it. But *Adam* did not *abuſe* it before he *ſin'd*; and by our Saviour's Rule [*To him that hath ſhall be given*] God would rather have given him *more*, then have taken away *any*. From whence it followes, that though the *working* of *Grace* in the *heart* of *Adam* was ſo *ſtrong* and ſo *perfect*, as to *enable* him to *ſtand*, and that in no leſſe then a ſtate of *Innocence*, yet was it alſo ſo *reſiſtible*, as to ſuffer him to *fall*, and that into no leſſe then a ſtate of *perdition*. And although he had the favour to be *rais'd* again in *ſome meaſure*, yet it was not to that *Innocence* from whence he *fell*. So that as to his *firſt Covenant*, and his firſt *pitch* of *perfection*, his *Fall* was not only *total*, but *final* too. And indeed I would know, why our Saviour hath told us, that *from him that hath not ſhall be taken away even that which he hath*, if it is not for this reaſon, *becauſe he hath laviſht out his talent*, and hath *reſiſted* that *power* of doing well which was *offer'd* him. Sure there is no better arguing then *ab actu ad potentiam*. Man *can reſiſt*, becauſe he *doth*. And I may wonder, as well as *Grotius*, why ſuch men are not *confuted* by their own *experience*, who ſay that *Grace* in the *elect* is *unreſiſtible*, unleſſe they will deny themſelves to be of the *number* of the *elect*. *David* hath

A reſult of the whole in two Examples.

Mat. 25. 28.

Grace to have done *better* then he did in the *double* matter of *Vriah*, but he *resisted* it with a *witnesse*, and that for *some moneths together*. He was a *vessel* of *election*; how then did he *resist* the *Grace* of God, so as to *fall* into those *damnable* and *killing sins*, in which, if he had been *snatcht away*, he had *perished irreversibly?* it was not *without Grace*, (for he was one of the *Elect*) nor by its *concurrence*, (for God was not *guilty*) it was therefore *against* the *working* and *means* of *Grace*. Indeed if God did his *utmost*, such as *David* could *never sin*. Or if they could, it would argue *God* to be *conquer'd* either by *man*, or *Devil*. Unlesse we should say, that such *omnipotent Grace* doth *come*, and *go*, and *come* again, after the measure that God is willing a man should *sin* and *repent*, and *sin* again. And therefore it is evident, that God Almighty, in his *Elect*, doth shew the *congruous efficacious Power*, but not the *irresistibility* and *Almightinesse* of his *Grace*. Sure *David* (and *Solomon*) did *fall* from *Grace*, by *resisting it*, in both acceptions of the word *Grace*; (as it is taken for *gracious* living, and as it is taken for the *favour of God*) and this *invincibly concludible* even from that very *answer* which is wont to be *alledged* for *irresistibility*. For they say that God had *decreed* the *Repentance* and *return* of *David*, and that therefore he could *not die*, *until* he had *repented*. Which is spoken by them for *this reason*, because if *David* had *not repented*, he must have *perisht*. Which yet he could not have done, if he had *continued* in the *state* of *Grace*.

And that cleared from an exception.

53. If against this it is excepted, That though a *vessel of Election* may *fall damnably from Grace*, yet he cannot *finally*, this is unworthy for a *Scholar* to *speak*, or *hear*; for who ever was *so silly*, as to *say* or *think*, that the precious *vessels* of *Election* can *fall* away *finally*? this is not *answering* the *argument*, but *forsaking* the *Question*. The *Question* is, whether the *Grace* of God doth work *irresistibly* in the *Elect*? not, whether or no it *brings them* to a most *certain* and *infallible* degree of *bliss*. (For they that *dispute* against the *first*, *affirm* the *second*.) *Grace* is proved to be *resistible* in Gods *Elect* by such examples as *David*. And to that it is answer'd, he could not *so resist* as to fall away *finally*. Which is first a *skipping* from the *first* Question to the *second*, and *secondly*, it is to say (what no man living doth

doth *gainſay*) That *ſuch as perſevere unto the end can never fall away finally*. A groſſe *identical propoſition*, which doth not only *betray* the *weakneſſe* of that *opinion* which it *aſſerteth*, but doth *eſtabliſh* the *Truth* of this very *cauſe* which I am *pleading*. For it confeſſeth, that *Grace* is *reſiſtible*, and only denies that it is *finally reſiſted*. *David* was *able* to *reſiſt* it, but he *did* not *reſiſt* it *unto the end*. And every *technical Grammarian* can diſtinguiſh the *Act* which is imply'd in the *Participle*, from the *Aptitude* which is couched in the *Adjective* in *bilis*. But (to haſten towards the concluſion of my Readers *ſufferings*) there is alſo a *final* as well as *total reſiſting* of ſuch a *Grace* as is *ſufficient* for the attainment of *Glory*. For (not to ſpeak of thoſe men who *reſiſted* and *ſinned* againſt *all the means* that could be uſed, *Iſa.* 5. 4. and who *alwaies reſiſted the holy Ghoſt*, *Act.* 7. 51. and who *would not be gathered*, *after* never ſo *many eſſays*, *Mat.* 23. 37.) how many *Chriſtian profeſſors* are now in *Hell*, who when they were *Infants* were *fit* and *ſuitable* for *Heaven*? *Shall not I ſpare* Nineveh, *in which are above* 120000 *ſouls*, *which cannot diſtinguiſh betwixt the right hand and the left*? *Jon.* 4. 11. God ſpeaks there of *Heathen Infants*, toward whom his *Bowels* did *yearn* within him, and that upon the *Impendence* of but a *temporal deſtruction*. But I ſpeak here of *Infants born* and *baptized* into a *membership* of the Church. How many are there of ſuch who in their *harmleſſe Nonage* were *babes* of *Grace*, and yet have *outlived* their *Innocence*, ſo as at laſt to be transformed into *veſſels* of *wrath*? I will ſhut up this *Paragraph* with the words of *Tertullian*. *Saul was turned into a Prophet by the Spirit of holineſſe, as well as into an Apoſtate by the ſpirit of uncleanneſſe. And the Devil entred into* Judas, *who for ſome time together had been deputed with the elect*. And with the ſaying of S. *Auguſtine*, That *if the regenerate and juſtified ſhall fall away into a wicked courſe of living by his own will and pleaſure, he cannot ſay, I have not received, becauſe he hath wilfully loſt that Grace of God which he had received, by that will of his*

Jonah 4. 11.

Saulem iam Dei Spiritus vertit in Prophetam, quàm & malus ſpiritus poſtea in Apoſtatam. Judam aliquandiu cum electis deputatum poſtea Diabolus intravit. Tertul. de Animâ. c. 11.

Si regeneratus & juſtificatus in malam vitam ſuâ voluntate relabitur, certò is non poteſt dicere, Non accepi, quia acceptam gratiam Dei ſuo in malum arbitrio libero amiſit. Aug. de Grat & Correp. c. 6. & c. 9.

which was at liberty to ſin. And how exactly that *Father doth ſpeak* my *ſenſe* of this buſineſſe, I leave it for any one to judge who ſhall conſult him *De præd. Sanct. l.* 1. *c.* 14. *De bono Perſev. l.* 2. *c.* 1. *&* 6. *& l.* 2. *c.* 8. *&* 13. And I would very fain know, whether the *loſt Groat*, the *loſt Sheep*, and the *prodigal Son*, do not ſignifie (in our *Saviours Parables*) that a *true beleever* may be *loſt*, and being *loſt* may be *found*, and again become a *true beleever*. Which is as much as I deſire to prove the thing under conſideration.

Chap. V.

54. *The Decree of Election conditional and reſpective.*

HAving evinced to my ſelf (and that is all that I pretend to) Firſt, that my will *of it ſelf* is *inclinable* to *evil*; and that, ſecondly, *of it ſelf* it is *not inclinable* to *good*; and that, thirdly, it is *inclined* by the *ſingular* and *ſpecial operation* of *Grace*, to the *refuſing* of *evil*, and to the *chooſing* of *good*, and that therefore in the *fourth place*, that *ſingular Grace* doth not *work* ſo *irreſiſtibly* as to *compel* an *unwilling will*, but yet ſo *ſtrongly* as to *heal* a *ſick* one; not ſo *neceſſitating* the *will* of God's elect, as that *inevitably* it *muſt*, but yet ſo *powerfully perſwading*, as that it *certainly will*, both *believe* and *obey*, and after *repentance perſevere* unto the *end*; I ſhould in *civility* to my *Reader* conclude his *Trouble*, if I were ſure that ſome men would not call it *Tergiverſation*; and if I were not *obliged* by *thoſe papers*, which have been ſo *frequently*, ſo *falſly* (that I may not ſay ſo maliciouſly) tranſcribed, and are *threatned* to be laid very *publiquely* to my *charge*, (and which I plead in the *defence* of this mine own *publication*, which I ſhould never have *choſen* upon *ſuch* a *ſubject*, as I have *leaſt* of all *ſtudied*, and am leaſt *delighted* in of any other) to remonſtrate the *utmoſt* of what I think in theſe matters. For I do *ſtedfaſtly beleeve* (what I alſo *aſſerted* in that *extemporary Diſcourſe*, which was the *innocent cauſe* of this *unacceptable effect*) That Gods *Decree* of *Election* from all *eternity*, was not *abſolute* and *irreſpective*, but in *reſpect*

Quâ gratiâ non nova voluntas creatur, neq; invita voluntas cogitur, ſed infirma ſanantur, depravata corrigitur, & ex malâ in bonam convertitur, ac interiore quodam modo trahitur, ut ex nolente volens efficiatur, & Divinæ vocationi libenter conſentiat, &c. Auguſt. de grat. & lib. arb. ad Valent. c. 13.

Sicut præſcit, prædeſtinat, & propterea prædeſtinat, quia quale ſuturum ſit, præſcit. Mala tantùm præſcit, & non prædeſtinat. Aug. in Reſp. ad calum. Pelag. ſub initium l. 6. Hypognoſticon.

ſpect unto, and in *præſcience* of ſome qualification, without which *no man is the proper object of ſuch Decree*. And this I prove to my ſelf from theſe waies of Reaſoning.

First, I conſider with my ſelf, that there is *no ſalvation* but
55. only to *ſuch*, as are found to be in *Chriſt Jeſus*, in the day of *Death* and of *Judgement*. Which no man living can be, unleſſe he be qualified with ſuch *conditions*, as *without which* it is *impoſſible* to be *ſo found*; (ſuch as are *Faith*, and *Obedience*, and *Repentance*, after ſin, *bringing forth ſuch fruits as are worthy of Repentance*, and *perſeverance* in *welldoing unto the end*.) That God will *ſave* none but *ſuch*, is *all men's Confeſſion*. And that he *ſaves* none but *ſuch* whom he *decrees* to ſave, is every whit as *plain*. Therefore none but *ſuch* are the *object* of *ſuch Decree*. For if he *decreed* to ſave any without *regard* or *reſpect* to their being ſuch, he might *actually ſave* them without *regard* or *reſpect* to their being *ſuch*. Becauſe whatſoever is *juſtly decreed*, may be juſtly *executed as* it is decreed. But it is granted on all ſides (as I ſuppoſe) that God will ſave *none* except *ſuch* as are found to be in *Chriſt* with the aforeſaid *qualifications*; and therefore it ſhould be *agreed* on all ſides, that he *decreed* to ſave *none* but *ſuch as they*. And what is that but a *reſpective* and *conditional* Decree? made in *intuition* of our *being* in *Chriſt*, and of our being *ſo qualified* to be *in Chriſt*? So that although *our election is not of works*, but *of him that calleth*, yet *good works* are required as a *neceſſary condition*, though utterly unworthy to be a *cauſe* of *our election*. Nor can it be without reſpect to the *condition* of the *Covenant*, that the *Covenant* is *made*, and the *promiſe decreed* to be *fulfilled*.

Proved by reaſon, from its being reſpective of our being in Chriſt, and of the conditions by which we are ſo.

56. *Secondly*, I conſider, that the *Decree* of the *Father* to *ſend* the *Son* to be a *ſecond Adam*, was in *reſpect* and *regard* to the *backeſliding* of the *firſt Adam*. Without which it was *impoſſible* that the Son of God ſhould have been ſent to be the *Saviour* of the world. And the *decree* of God Almighty to ſave the *firſt Adam*, was in regard of and *reſpect* to the *meritorionſneſs* of the *ſecond Adam*. For God *adopteth* never a *childe*, nor doth *acknowledge* him for *his own*, ſo as to give him *eternal life*, unleſſe it be for the ſake of his *only begotten Son*. Firſt God *pitied* a *woful world*, then he *loved* what he *pitied*, next he *gave* his own *Son* to *ſave* what he

Eph. 1. 4, 6. Rom. 8. 39. 1 Cor. 5. 15.

loved, and upon the *condition* of *beleeving in his Son*, he gave it a promiſe of *eternal life*. For ſo *beleeving* is *interpoſed* betwixt *love* and *life*, in the 3. of S. *John* verſ. 26. *God ſo loved the world*, that he gave his only *begotten Son*, that whoſoever *beleeveth in him*, ſhould not periſh, but have *everlaſting life*. From this Text it appeareth, that God *loved* the *world before* he *gave* his *Son* to it; for *therefore gave* he his *Son*, becauſe he *loved* it. But it was not a *love* by which he loved it to *life everlaſting*; for with *ſuch love* he only loved it in his *Son*. And the world is not capable of ſuch a *love* without the *condition* of *beleeving*. It was therefore in præſcience of our *beleeving in Chriſt*, that God *elected* us to *life eternal*. For Chriſt is not *only* the *means*, (as ſome affirm) but the *meritorious cauſe*, and the *Head* of our *Election*. *Chriſt was foreknown*, 1 *Pet.* 1. 2. and *we in him*, *Rom.* 8. 29. Chriſt was *prædeſtin'd*, and *we by him*, *Eph.* 1. 5.

57. *And from the nature of Election.*

Thirdly, I conſider, that there muſt be a *Difference* before there can be an *Election*. *Love* indeed is an *act* of *favour*, but *Election* is properly an *act* of *Judgement*; a *preferring* of the *better* before the *worſe*. They that ſay God *Elected* ſuch a number of men without the leaſt *intuition* of their qualifications by which they are differenced from the *reprobated crew*, do ſpeak *illogically* (to ſay no worſe.) how much *ſafer* is it to ſay, That becauſe ſuch men as are *in Chriſt by Faith* are *better* then ſuch as are *out of Chriſt* by *Infidelity*, therefore *thoſe* are *taken*, and *theſe* are *left*? Nor doth this *derogate* from *God*, or *arrogate* to *man*, to ſay, he *chooſeth* his own *gifts*, any more then it doth, to ſay, *he crowns them*. For God doth *give* us the *advantage* of our being *in Chriſt*, as well as *chooſe* us for that *advantage*. Firſt he *giveth* us his *Son*, next he giveth us his *Grace* whereby to *enable* us to *believe* in his *Son*, and ſo *beleeving* he doth *elect* us. So that here is no *matter* for man to *boaſt* on; he having *nothing* which he hath not *received*, no not ſo much as his ἀυτεξούσιον. It is *God* that *makes* the *difference*, as well as *God* that *chooſeth*. And it ſeems this very argument from the *Nature* and *Uſe* of the word *Election*, did prevail with S. *Auſtin* and *Oecumenius*.

Εἰπὼν καὶ ἐκλογὴν, ἔδειξεν ὅτι χὴ διάφορον εἶλήλαμεν· ὕδιὰ χὸ ἐκλέγῃ ἕτερον ἀπ' ἑτέρου, οἷον τι αὐτῷ διαλλάττει. *Oecum. apud Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Lam. Jud.*

nius. S. *Austin* ſaith expreſly, that *Juſtification precedeth Election*; and his reaſon is, becauſe no man is *elected unleſſe he differ from him that is rejected.* *Non tamen Electio præcedit Juſtificationem, ſed Electionem Juſtificatio. Nemo enim eligitur, niſi jam diſtans abillo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum eſt, Quia eleget nos Deus ante mundi conſtitutionem, non video quomodo ſit diſcendum niſi præſcientiâ.* Auguſt. ad Simpl. l. 2.

58. *Fourthly*, I conſider, that the whole *Tenor* of the *Scriptures*, in the *judgement* of *all* the *Fathers*, who are beſt able to *underſtand them*, teacheth no other *Predeſtination*, then *in*, and *through Chriſt*, which is *reſpective* and *conditional*. Firſt the Scripture gives us none but *conditional promiſes*, ſuch as, *If any man keep my ſaying, he ſhall never taſte Death. Whatſoever a man ſoweth that ſhall he reap.* And *we ſhall reap if we faint not. If any man will hear my voice, and open the doore, I will come in to him*, &c. Nay even the very Texts which are wont to be urged for *irreſpective Election* do ſeem very preciſely to *evince* the *contrary*. For when God is ſaid to *prædeſtine* according to *his good pleaſure which he had purpoſed in himſelf*, the word εὐδοκία rendred *good pleaſure*, doth not ſignifie the *abſoluteneſſe*, but the *reſpectiveneſſe* of his *will*. For it *relateth* to ſomething in which God is *well pleaſed*, and that is *Chriſt*. It being impoſſible for God to *pleaſe himſelf* with *mankinde*, or for *men* to be *acceptable* and *well pleaſing* to God, any otherwiſe then in *him*, of whom it was ſaid, *This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleaſed.* Beſides, *all* thoſe *Scriptures* which doe teach *univerſal Grace*, and *Redemption*, (which I ſuppoſe hath been *proved* in the proſecution of my *firſt Principle*) do ſeem to me moſt clearly to inferre a *reſpective* and *conditional Election*. For if it is true, that Chriſt did offer up himſelf, not only *ſufficiently*, but *intentionally* for all; if he did *earneſtly deſire* that *every one* would *come in*, upon the preaching of his *Word*, and receive the benefit of his *Death* and *Paſſion*; if his *warnings* were not in *jeſt*, and his *invitations ſerious*; if [*depart from me ye curſed*] was therefore *foretold*, that every one might *beware* and not *obtrude* himſelf upon that *ſentence*; if he is *unwilling* that any one ſhould be *Proved by Scripture.* Joh. 8. 51. Gal. 6. 7, 9. Rev. 3. 20. Eph. 1. 9.

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caught in the *Serpents ſnare*, who ſhewes to *all* (without exception) a *certain way* to *eſcape*; if (as S. *Auſtin ſpeaks*) *he* is deſirous *not* to *ſtrike*, who bids us *look* to our *poſture*, and *ſtand* upon our *Guard*; if (as S. *Auſtin* ſpeaks *again*) he ſhews his *power* to *puniſh none* but only thoſe that *refuſe* his *Mercy*; and would not *damn* any *one* without *reſpect* to *ſin*, who gave his *own Son* to die for *all*; then his refuſing of the *Goats* in *reſpect* of that which makes them *differ* from *Sheep*, infers his *Election* of the *ſheep*, in *reſpect* of that which makes them differ from *Goats*. And I have made the more haſte to make *this Inference*, becauſe as the *reſpectiveneſſe* of *Election* needs not otherwiſe to be proved then by the *reſpectiveneſſe* of *Reprobation*; ſo they are both taken for *granted*, upon the ſuppoſition of *Chriſt's* having dyed not only *ſufficiently*, but *intentionally* for *all*. Towards which (having diſcourſed ſo largely of it already) I will only offer this *one conſideration* which *meets* my *pen* as I am *writing*, and even *obtrudes* it ſelf upon me to be *delivered*. It is briefly this. That ſince our *Saviour* upon the *Croſſe*, did very *heartily pray*, even for thoſe very *homicides*, and *parricides*, and *Deicides* that *Kill'd* him, we have no reaſon but to beleeve, That he *laid down* his *life* even for *them* that *took it away*; and that he *dyed* for *all* for whom he *prayed*. And yet we reading of their *Murders*, but not of their *Repentance*, I ſhould be loth to tell *my people*, that thoſe *crucifying wretches*, were *precious veſſels* of *Election*, (in complyance with that opinion, that *Chriſt died only for the Elect*) leſt they ſhould *comfort* up themſelves in the moſt *crimſon ſins* that can be named (like ſome in the world) as *well conſiſting* with their *pretenſions* to the *Kingdome* of *Heaven*. And yet in my *ſhallow Judgement*, (which becauſe it is *ſhallow*, I do ſubmit to thoſe of *deeper* and *profounder reach*, how *dogmatically* ſoever I may ſeem to have ſpoken in many places of this Diſcourſe) I ſay in my ſhallow Judgement, Chriſt dyed for *all* for whom he *prayed*; and he *prayed* for them that *curſt themſelves*. *His bloud be upon us* (ſaid they) and yet (ſaid he) *Father forgive them*. He made his *Murderers Execration* become his *prayer*. He took the *poyſon* out of their

Aug. in Serm. 28. de Sanct. Idem contra 2 epiſt. Pelag. l 3. c. 2. Idem de ſp. & lit. ad Marcell. c. 33.

their *Curſe*, and made it *wholſome* for them. He *wiſhed*, as well as they, *that his blood might be both upon them and upon their children*; but in his own moſt *mercifull*, not in their barbarous and *cruel ſenſe*; for *they* meant the *guilt*, *He* the *benefit* of his *blood*; and would have it *light on them*, not to *accuſe*, but *cleanſe* them. And yet I dare not affirm, that they were all a *portion* of *God's Elect*.

59. Laſtly, I conſider, that the main *ſtream* of the *Fathers* doth *run* this *way*. And not to trouble my *Reader* with ſuch a *Catalogue* of particulars, as I gave in before, for a *Conditionall Reprobation*, (which yet I think were very eaſie upon a very *ſmal warning*) I will content my ſelf at preſent to prove what I ſay from the confeſſions of *Beza*, and Doctor *Twiſſe*. Firſt *Beza* in his *Comment* upon *Rom.* 11. 2. rejects the Judgement of the *Fathers*, becauſe they are not (as he would have them) for the *abſolute*, *irreſpective*, *unconditionall* way. And Dr. *Twiſſe* confeſſeth, that *all the Ancients*, before S. *Auſtin*, did place the *object* of *God's Election* in *Fide prævisâ*. At which S. *Auſtin* was ſo far from being any way diſpleaſed, as that (with very great *reverence* to their *Authority*) he made it appear to be an *innocent* and *harmleſſe Tenent*. He affirmed that all the *Fathers*, who lived before himſelf, agreed in this, *That the Grace of God is not prevented by humane merits*. Which *one profeſſion* he thought *ſufficient for the aſſerting of the free Grace of the Divine prædeſtination*. To which ſaying of S. *Auſtin*, becauſe I finde that Dr. *Twiſſe* doth very *readily ſubſcribe*; I ought in reaſon to be ſecured from any very *hard cenſure*, becauſe I am not an *affirmer* of *humane merits*, much leſſe do I *place* them in a *precedency* to *Grace*.

And by Antiquity, from the conceſſions of Anti remonſtrants.

Patres hîc nullo modo audiendi, qui ad prævisionem hoc referunt. Beza in Rom. 11. 2. edit. 2.

Twiſſ. in Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 8. ſect. 4. p. 110.

Auguſt. de bono perſever. c. 19. & 20.

Twiſſ. loco cit. p. 110.

60. I conclude with a deſire of ſo much *liberty* of *conſcience*, as to beleeve with S. *Paul*, That *God is a reſpecter*, *not of* * *Perſons*, but of * *Works*. That my *ſins* are *perfectly* and *entirely mine own*. And that if I do any thing that is *good*, it is *not I that do it*, but the *Grace* of *God* that is *in* me. Yet ſo, as that *I can* do *all things* through him that *ſtrengthens* me. And who doth *ſo ſtrengthen* as that I *may* do them,

The Concluſion.

* Rom. 2. 11.
* Verſ. 19.

1 Cor. 15. 10.

but not so *force* me as that I *must*. In this, and every other thing, I have been long since taught by *Vincentius Lirinensis*, (whom I shall ever observe to the *utmost* of my *Discretion*) To *opine* with the *most*, and *most judicious*, rather then with the *fewest*, and least *discerning*. *Opiniastrete* is a *fault*, but *Fallibility* is *none*. If my *Teachers* are in the *right*, they have *knowledge* enough to make me *moderately instructed*; if they are any where in the *wrong*, they have *authority* enough to make me *pardonably erroneous*; if I have not *perspicacity* to *comprehend* them as they deserve, it seems they have *Depths* enough to prove, I am *Invincibly ignorant*.

The End.

ERRATA'S.

PAg. 2. *lin.* 19. *read* extemporary Diſcourſe, *p.* 10. *l.* 30. *r.* and doth ſo move, *p.* 11. *l.* 10. *dele* upon, *l.* 12. *for* of *r.* to mine own, *p.* 17. *l.* 15. *f.* ſure *r.* here. *p.* 19. *l.* 8. *f.* propoſition *r.* propoſition, *l.* 25. *after* look *adde* for, *p.* 21. *l.* 19. *f.* unworthy *r.* worthy, *p.* 23. *l.* 4. *after* retnrn to *adde* that, *p.* 24. *l.* 25. *f.* Joh. 4. *r.* Joh. 8, *p.* 33. *l.* 18. *after* we *adde* may, *p.* 44. *l. ult. r.* Gallorum, *p.* 45. *l.* 4. *after* id. *r.* ibid. *p.* 53. *l.* 30. *f.* æquivocable *r.* æquivocal, *p.* 60. *l.* 19. *f.* Cant. 1. 14. *r.* Cant. 1. 4. *l.* 29. *f.* efficacious *r.* effectual, *p.* 61. *l.* 4. *f.* Catechreſis *r.* Catachreſis, *p.* 71. *l.* 5. *f.* eleget *r.* elegit.